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ABSTRACT
This study was suggested by Flannery O'Connor's assertion 
that her "aesthetic teeth" were cut on Jacques Maritain's Art and 
Scholasticism. The purpose has been to arrive at the connection 
between the meaning of the phrase and her practice as a literary 
artist. To this end, all of O'Connor's letters in any way refer—  
ring to Maritain's book were examined, to gauge further the 
extent to which the book had impressed her, and for what reasons.
A detailed investigation of the contents of Art and Scho- 
lasticism was then carried out, in an effort to experience the 
book in a way similar to that in which O'Connor herself had 
experienced it. An exploration of her essays and letters fol­
lowed, in which a large number of echoes were found of numerous 
points in the content of Art and Scholasticism. Three central 
points, equally emphasized in the writings of O'Connor and in Art 
and Scholasticism. were selected as criteria for analyzing O'Con­
nor's habit of art: 1) art inevitably implies a struggle; 2) art 
can only begin to be perceived through the senses; and 3) art 
demands the undivided attention and dedication of the artist to 
the work that is being brought into being.
Point one is illustrated with reference to O'Connor's own 
account, taken from her letters, of the process through which 
Wise Blood began, developed, and was brought to publication.
Point two is elaborated through the presentation of images from 
Ulise Blood. selected for their exceptional fitness for cartoon 
animation. Point three shows, by presenting radically opposed 
interpretations of Wise Blood— which are only reconcilable
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through the concept of art presented in Art and
Scholasticism— that O'Connor's novel is a work of art, rather 
than religious propaganda.
The study concludes that, for O'Connor, cutting her "aes­
thetic teeth" on Art and Scholasticism signified that, in per­
ceiving its analysis of the nature of art as one to which she 
could assent, she had been enabled both to recognize herself as 
qualified to become an artist, and to take on irrevocably the 
task of developing her own habit of art.
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RESUMO
Este trabalho foi sugerido pela afirmação de Flannery 
O'Connor que sua "dentição estética" nasceu através do contato 
com fi>rt and Scholasticism de Jacques Maritain. 0 propósito foi 
chegar a uma interpretação do sentido da frase. Para este fim, 
todas as cartas de O'Connor referentes de alguma maneira à obra 
de Maritain foram examinadas, para sondar com mais exatidão até 
que ponto e por que motivos o livro impressionara tio profunda­
mente.
Uma investigação detalhada foi feita do conteúdo de fi>rt and 
Scholasticism para que a obra pudesse ser percebida de uma manei­
ra parecida com a da própria Flannery O'Connor. Uma pesquisa de 
seus ensaios e suas cartas seguiu, que revelou numerosos ecos de 
diversos trechos que constam no texto de Maritain. Tres pontos 
principais, enfatizados tanto nos escritos de O'Connor quanto em 
Art and Scholasticism^ foram escolhidos como critérios na análise 
do hábito artístico de O'Connor: 1) a prática da arte implica uma 
luta; 2) a arte somente pode ser percebida pelos sentidos; e 3)a 
prática da arte exige do artista dedicação indivisa à obra nas­
cente.
0 primeiro ponto se exemplifica através da descrição da 
própria O'Connor, encontrada em suas cartas, do processo através 
do qual h/ise Blood se iniciou, se desenvolveu, e chegou a ser 
editado. 0 segundo ponto foi elaborado mediante a apresentação de 
imagens de Wise Blood escolhidas pela sua adequação notável a 
representação em desenho animado. 0 ponto três mostra, pelas 
interpretações radicalmente opostas de h/iss Blood— reconciliáveis 
unicamente através do conceito de arte apresentado em fírt and
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Scholasticism— que o romance de O'Connor se classifica como obra 
de arte e nao como propaganda religiosa.
0 estudo conclui que, para O'Connor, o brotar da dentição 
estética, através da leitura de fírt and Scholasticism, significou 
que, ao perceber na análise da natureza da arte algo com que 
podia concordar, ela reconhece tanto sua própria capacidade de 
tornar— se uma artista literária, quanto sua vontade de assumir a 
tarefa de desenvolver em sua pessoa o hábito da arte.
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Jacques Maritain's book declares at the outset that the 
Schoolmen, western Christian civilization’s prime philosophers 
from the ninth until the 17th century, had no formal philosophy 
of art, but rather a "very profound theory of art", the elements 
of which are to be found in "austere treatises on some problem of 
logic . . . or of moral theology" (3).
Maritain's strategy, therefore, in effecting his intended 
synthesis (he disclaims its having exhausted the possibilities of 
the Schoolmen's maxims for use in the construction of a "rich and 
complete theory of Art" (94)), is first to seek in the Metaphys­
ics of the ancients their understanding of the Beautiful, and 
then to confront that with, as Maritain baldly puts it, "Art".^
The announced purpose of this confrontation is to disclose 
the error of the "Aesthetics" (the quotation marks are Marit­
ain's) which, as the product of contemporary philosophers (un­
named) who have restricted their understanding of art exclusively 
to the fine arts, thus limiting the discussion of the beautiful 
to its expression in these, "runs the risk of vitiating both the 
nation of Art and the notion of the Beautiful" (4).
The Schoolmen, in contrast, although without a formal phi­
losophy of art and whose theory of art, as has been seen, lies 
scattered in assorted treatises on other subjects, did debate art 
in general (the shipbuilder's, grammarian's , logician's), includ­
ing (but only incidentally) the nature of art as such, while 
leaving aside altogether the subject of the fine arts. It is from 
this more general point of view that Maritain hopes to offer
Chapter I: A Close Look at Art and Scholasticism
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correctives for "the immenBe intellectual disorder inherited from 
the nineteenth century, and of finding once more the spiritual 
conditions of honest i^ ork" (4).
1.1 The Distinction between Making and Doing
The human intellect is one in being, but functions in two 
ways. To clarify its mode of operation, Maritain, following 
Aristotle^ and Thomas Aquinas^, first recalls the metaphysicians' 
distinction between the speculative and the practical order, as 
well as the virtues pertaining to each. Accordingly, to the 
speculative order belong the Understanding of first principles. 
Science, and Wisdom: those virtues by means of which the intel­
lect exercises its sole function, i.e., to know. To the practical 
order, on the other hand, pertains that virtue which, rather than 
being turned towards the pure interiority of knowledge, is di­
rected to action, in a word, art, which is found wherever "some 
productive operation [is] to be contrived, some work to be made"
(6) .
Within this practical order to which art pertains exist two 
distinct spheres, called by the ancients of classical Greece and 
Rome "Doing" {agibile) and "Making" {factibile). The first of 
these is understood as "the free use, precisely as free, of our 
faculties" (7) directed with no regard for that which is made, 
but rather by the Will, whose interest is exclusively in the good 
of man; the increase of his being and the fulfillment of his 
desire. As to whether a particular act is good or not, that 
depends on its conformity (or lack of it) with "the true end of 
human life" which Maritain identifies as "God Himself sovereignly 
loved" (8).
Making, in contrast, is defined by the Schoolmen as " produc-
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tjve action, considered . . . with regard to the thing produced" 
(B), this "thing produced" being a self-sufficient end in which 
resides the good of the act. And it is in this action that Art 
first appears, ruling Making, in a sphere beyond the human in so 
far as its ends, rules, and values are determined by a single 
criterion; "the exigencies and good of the work" (9). Thus, the 
artifex, the artist or artisan, is in effect a servant confined 
to a world ruled solely by the thing-to-be-made, a situation 
regarded by Maritain as a sort of deliverance: "the ennui of 
living and willing stop at the door of every workshop" (9).
In that same workshop, however, what is nonhuman art (from 
the standpoint of its end) becomes essentially human in its mode 
of operating: the work-to-be-made is brooded over, ripened in a 
mind before being birthed in matter and permanently stamped with 
the "color and savor of the spirit" (9). From this process 
proceeds that which Maritain identifies as art's formal element, 
since "what constitutes [art] in its species and makes it what it 
is, is its being ruled by the intellect" (9) in a rule which, if 
art is to exist at all, must necessarily be as ruthless as that 
of the thing-to-be-made over the artifex. For the work itself is 
merely the matter, whose form is undeviating reason.
1.2 The Nature of Art and the Notion of the Habit
Because art originates as an idea it is by nature intellec­
tual, inhering as a quality in the intelligence of the artifex. 
Essentially a stable disposition perfecting in its nature the 
subject in which it inheres, this quality was denominated by the 
ancients habitus which, although both are acquired through exer—  
cise and use, Maritain' warns us not to confuse with "habit" in
10
the modern sense. For whereas habit is mechanical and lodged in 
the nerves, "operative habitus^ which attests the activity of the 
spirit, resides principally in an immaterial faculty, in the 
intelligence or the will" (11).
This habxtuSf which proportions the intellect to and makes 
it commensurate with a given activity, is acquired through pre­
cisely the activity itself, engaged in consistently and directed 
towards a given end. As a result, the intellect is progressive1y 
modified, immeasurably enriching its subject: "The man who pos­
sesses a habitus has within him a quality which nothing can pay 
for or replace; others are naked, he is armed with steel: but it 
is a case of a living and spiritual armor" (11).
The armor is as permanent as the object by which the habit 
is specified or, in another formulation, the quality created by 
the practice of art is as unalterable as the nature of art it­
self. Maritain shows that the two are reciprocally related, for 
if it is the nature of art which specifies the habitus, only 
through the habitus is art realized in being. (Wryly, Maritain 
notes that the habitus— permanent, forceful, rigid— is also a 
social liability: "hen of the world, polished on all sides, do 
not like the man of habitus, with his asperities" (12).)
This habitus of the practical intellect, which is Art, is 
also a virtue, defined as a quality through which the original 
indetermination of a faculty is triumphed over and drawn to a 
certain maximum of perfection and operative efficiency" (12). In 
contrast with that "lack and infirmity" called evil, virtue is 
defined by Aquinas as essentially "a habitus operative of good".^ 
Without the habitus, the virtue, there is no good in the 
work, for, continues Aquinas, "the manner of action follows the 
disposition of the agent, and, as a man is, so are his works".^ 
And it is upon this connaturality, this intimate similarity
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between the workman and his work, that Art is concretely real­
ized, for no work of art exists which was not first present in 
the workman, "conformed to it, so as to be able to form it"
(12), again: through the virtue, the habitus.
Furthermore, as habitus is a virtue of the practical intel­
lect, tending by necessity towards the good. Art (= virtue = 
habitus) implies "infallible rectitude" (13). Its step is never 
false; its only truth (and here Maritain paraphrases John of St. 
Thomas) consists in "directing, in conformity with what ought to 
be according to the rule and measure of the thing to be effected"
(13),^ This infallible rectitude, however, is restricted to "the 
formal element of the operation, that is to say, the regulation 
of the work by the mind" (13), because, in the execution, a 
trembling hand, a defect in an instrument, can impede art's 
perfect realization. But such problems are considered by the 
Schoolmen to lie outside of art's strictly mental realm. For 
them, skill is a subject apart.
In their efforts to distinguish precisely the nature of Art, 
the ancients compared it with another virtue of the practical 
intellect: Prudence, whose concern is the discernment and the 
application of means to moral ends, themselves subordinate to 
God, the ultimate end of human life. In this sense, however. 
Prudence is also an art: that of living well, whereas Art (as we 
have seen) operates only for the good of the work. In their own 
sphere, good and bad are measured solely by their effects on what 
is being made and, according to Aquinas, as long as the artist 
works well, his sweet or sour disposition is irrelevant.^
But, of course, what is being spoken of here is the artist 
pure, an entirely amoral abstraction in contrast with its con­
crete realization, whose human condition precedes and is the
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condition for further refinements. For example, it is upon the 
specific artist's rectitude of will, its ordering to the good of 
the whole man, that the use of his power depends: "art gives only 
the power of making well (facultas boni operls), and not the use
Q
itself of making well" (16). However, although as a power art 
may be badly used, or not used at all, as a virtue of the practi­
cal intellect it remains intact, and its judgments are infalli­
ble.'^
As for the rules by which the artist works, the fact that 
art is ordered by the good of its matter, i.e., the abject to be 
made, renders its rules stable and fixed, unlike those of pru­
dence, which vary in each case, according to a judgment reached 
through that "which the ancients called consilium (deliberation, 
counsel)" (IS). But the art considered in this comparison is 
generic, not specific; its product is, as in the mechanical arts, 
a ship or a clock, matter formed to a determined end by reason's 
unwavering rules. And even in the case of Medicine, Agriculture, 
or Strategy, wherein the matter is particularly imperfect, fixed 
rules still apply, although accidentally requiring first the 
application of contingent rules, as well as that same delibera­
tion exercised in the judgments proper to prudence.
In conclusion, the Schoolmen can be said to have seen in the 
Artist an Intellectual who makes (as distinguished from the 
Scientist, an Intellectual who demonstrates), and in the Prudent 
Man an intelligent being of Will, who acts well (20). Further—  
more, this intellectual-who-makes includes great masters and 
simple village artisans alike, all of whom are endowed with the 
same intellectual virtue, i.e., a certain perfection of the 
spirit. Indeed, as the artisan "represented the general run of 
men . . .  in the normal type of human development . . . of truly 
human civilizations" (20), the intellectual virtue of art should
13
in principle be as easily found as common man himself.
1.3 The Nature of the Fine Arts
With respect to the fine arts, the ancients did not regard 
them as a category apart. Rather, the arts were distinguished as 
servile (requiring bodily labor), or liberal, when the construc­
tion is purely spiritual. Thus, painting and sculpture are ser­
vile arts, whereas music, arithmetic, and logic are liberal, 
sounds, numbers, and concepts having, prior to their materializa­
tion, been arranged in the soul. How then does Maritain arrive at 
the category of fine art, unspecified as it is by both Aristotle 
and the Schoolmen?
He begins with Aquinas's simple definition of the beautiful 
per effectumz "id quod visum placet", "that which, being seen, 
pleases" (23).^*^ Accordingly, beauty's terms are two: the vi­
sion, or intuitive knowledge, and the resultant delight, not from 
the act of knowing (which itself is delightful), but rather from 
the qualities of the particular object known. In other words, it 
is by one's exultation on apprehending some object that the 
presence of beauty is recognized.
Insofar as that which knows most fully is the intelligence, 
beauty is essentially its object and by nature dwells in an 
intelligible world from which, says Maritain, it descends. But, 
since our intelligence is human and not angelically intuitive, 
the perception of beauty is dependent, "enormously", "well-nigh 
indispensably", on the senses. Maritain recognizes that in human 
beings the intuitiveness necessary if beauty is to be perceived 
is perfect only in sense knowledge; intelligence's "sight", on 
the other hand, depends on abstracting and discourse. Therefore,
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although the enjoyment of purely intelligible being is possible, 
that which is "connatural to man is the beautiful that delights 
through the senses and through their intuition" (24). This 
beauty proper to art, having now been defined by its effects, 
remains to be defined by its nature.
Maritain says that beauty is "essentially a certain excel­
lence or perfection in the proportion of things to the intellect" 
(24). Its three conditions according to Aquinas are integrity, 
proportion, and radiance, or clarity, which, materialized in fine 
art and perceived through the senses, respectively pleasure the 
intellect in (1) fullness of being, (2) order and unity and, 
above all, (3) light and intelligibility.^^
This last, a kind of splendor, is attributed by the ancients 
to beauty, whereas for the Platonists it is an attribute of 
truth, and for Augustine, of order. Aquinas, however, according 
to Maritain understands light as a consequence of form, that 
principle constituting the "proper perfection of all that 
is . . .  in their essences and qualities", "the ontological 
secret" borne within things, the "spiritual being, . . . operat­
ing mystery" and, above all, "the proper principle of intelligi­
bility, the proper clarity of every thing" (24-25).
For his part, Maritain describes beauty as "a flashing of 
intelligence on a matter intelligibly arranged" (25), from 
which, when recognized by the intellect, arises the delight of 
seeing itself reflected. In other words, in the intellect's 
recognition of beauty, light meets light. Conversely, because 
sensible beauty alone cannot delight the intellect, odors, no 
matter how pleasing, are not beautiful in the complete way possi­
ble to colors.
The clearer the comprehension of how thoroughly the percep­
tion of beauty is sense-dependent, the clearer becomes the dis­
15
tinction between the acts of, on one hand, intuiting beauty and, 
on the other, abstracting scientific truth. For abstraction is 
the fruit of intellectual labor, whereas in the apprehension of 
beauty, "like a stag at a gushing spring, intelligence has noth­
ing to do but drink; it drinks the clarity of being" (26).
As for the materialization of beauty, Maritain emphasizes 
that this is possible in "not just one . . . but a thousand or 
ten thousand ways" (27); Venus de Milo's arm is missing, a 
futurist's painted lady has a quarter of one eye, but in such 
instances, because what is present is sufficient for the particu­
lar case, integrity exists. Likewise, "Roualt's clowns are . . . 
perfectly proportioned in their genre" (27). For proportion, 
like integrity, can be understood only in relation to a given 
end. Isolated, it becomes an abstraction.
Similarly, radiance of form is ontological rather than 
conceptual, i.e., it resides in the work itself, whether accessi­
ble to the perceiver or not, and, in fact says Maritain, the more 
profound the radiance, the more hidden. But however hidden or 
evident, this radiance of form for the Schoolmen is both the 
principle of intelligibility and the proper principle of mystery, 
insofar as mystery exists when what is to be known exceeds our 
comprehension. Thus, "to define the beautiful by the radiance of 
the form is in reality to define it by the radiance of a mystery" 
(28) .
Maritain points out that, as the radiance of form may be 
present in obscure as well as clear works, so may the radiance of 
mystery, although this latter naturally appears more strikingly 
in the obscurity of every genuinely new work. At any rate, clear 
or obscure, and to whatever degree a created thing may be beauti­
ful, it is not equally discernible as such by its perceivers, for
16
it is beautiful under aspects not recognizable by all.
1-4 The Transcendence of Beauty
Maritain observes that, although the beautiful shines forth 
from intelligibly disposed matter, it belongs equally to the 
order of the transcendenta1s , i.e., "objects of thought which 
transcend every limit of genus and category . . . [imbuing] 
everything and . . . found everywhere" (30). This specific 
transcendental presence in being, as one of its properties, 
"everywhere present and everywhere varied" (30), is evident in 
the delight found by the intellect in all which is.
Just as being is particu1arized, so is beauty in each thing 
which exists. But because it is transcendent, beauty draws the 
soul of its perceiver beyond the created, heavenward, and great 
art, because it occasions in its perceiver a sensing of and a 
thirsting for a plenitude of beauty which it only suggests, has 
been said by Baudelaire and Poe alike (32) to induce irritabili­
ty and even sorrow, because we have not yet arrived at the desti­
nation to which it points. Furthermore, when a work tends towards 
this beauty rather than towards something serviceable, some means 
(a ship or a clock) to an end, then the realm of the fine arts is 
entered, where that which is made is an end in itself. And even 
if "it is material and enclosed in a genus, as beautiful it 
belongs to the kingdom of the spirit and plunges deeply into the 
transcendence and the infinity of being" (33).
Maritain says that fine arts are to the genus art as man is 
to the genus animal. Since both are points of encounter between 
matter and spirit, like man the fine arts have a spiritual soul, 
and their contact with the beautiful has modified in them certain 
characteristics of art in general, notably and not surprisingly
17
with respect to the rules of art, which cannot be expected to 
govern identically artifacts as dissimilar, for example, as 
Rouault's clowns and a pair of boots.
Developing further the consequences of his analogy between 
man and the fine arts, Maritain asserts that contact with the 
beautiful has also "[disclosed] and [carried] to a sort of excess 
other generic characteristics of the virtue of art, above all its 
intellectual character and its resemblance to the speculative 
virtues" (33). Nor is this surprising; fine artists materialize 
visions, bind beauty and matter, occasion delight. Ipso facto, 
their mode of operation cannot be a simple duplication of the 
blacksmith's, whose material and ends are well-defined by specif­
ic, everyday needs.
By way of further clarification, Maritain introduces an 
analogy between the fine arts and wisdom, both of which in addi­
tion to being ends in themselves are "ordered to an object which 
transcends man and which is of value in itself, and whose ampli­
tude is limitless, for beauty, like being, is infinite" (33).
The fine arts and wisdom are further linked by their relation to 
contemplation, although whereas wisdom's act is contemplation, 
the fine arts "aim at producing intellectual delight, that is to 
say, a kind of contemplation" (34), necessarily pre-existent in 
the artist.
However, a great difference exists as well, for Art belongs 
to the order of Making; "it is by drudgery upon some matter that 
it aims at delighting the spirit" (34). Therefore, although 
engaged in the business of incarnating the spiritual soul which 
characterizes fine art, the artist "must wear himself out among 
bodies" (34), participating fully for better or worse in the 
human condition. "Without enjoying the substance and the peace of
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wisdom, he is [both] caught up in the hard exigencies of the 
speculative life, and . . . condemned to all the servile miseries 
of practice and of temporal production" (35).
Maritain emphasizes that the results of both the wiseman's 
and artist's efforts can only be relatively delightful, because 
neither agent is capable of satiating more than partially the 
hunger and thirst of the human spirit. As for art specifically, 
it is "folly to seek in [it] the words of eternal life and the 
repose of the human heart; the artist, if he is not to shatter 
his art or his soul, must simply be an artist, what God wants him 
to be - a good workman" (36).
Concluding his considerations on beauty and art, Maritain 
observes that the modern world has seduced the artist with its 
promises, and left him barely able to survive. He cites the two 
principles upon which, for him, the age is founded: "the fecundi­
ty of money and the finality of the useful" (36), which have 
destroyed man by stranding him on a treadmill of never— ending 
need, destroying the soul's leisure and making of material goods 
ends in themselves, thus preventing man from discovering his 
spiritual identity and kinship. But, in spite of these condi­
tions, the artist's vocation by nature leads to beauty and thus 
back to the lost, true direction. Indeed, it is Maritain's pre­
diction that through the artist's "disinterested activity, the 
human race will live" (37).
1.5 The Rules of Art
When he turns to the discussion of art's rules, Maritain 
says that "the whole formal element of art consists in the regu­
lation which it imprints on matter" (38). Indeed, the ancients 
regarded fixed rules as part of art's essence [38], although
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these are not "conventional imperatives imposed on art from 
without, but the ways of operation peculiar to art itself, the 
ways of working reason, ways high and hidden" (38). Maritain 
compares these rules to preexisting paths through a tangled 
thicket, which must be discovered (176). Inhering in the habi­
tus, the virtue of art, they are the tools of the artist, through 
which he "holds . . . matter and the real", and although he may 
act above them it will only be "in conformity with a higher rule 
and a more hidden order" (39).
To convey more exactly the elusive nature of these rules, 
Maritain contrasts them with Descartes' concept of "method as an 
infallible and easy means of bringing to the truth 'those who 
have not studied' and society people" (40). The rules likewise 
differ as much from Leibnitz's "logic and language whose most 
wonderful characteristic is that it dispenses from thinking", as 
from "the taste, the charming curiosity, the spiritual acephaly 
of the Enlightenment" (40).
In an egalitarian atmosphere, says Maritain, it is in such 
ways that habitus must be denied, for it is a virtue held by the 
few, as the ancients recognized, perceiving as they did that the 
access to beauty and truth is difficult, reachable only through a 
discipline capable of elevating the seeker so he may in some way 
become proportional in stature to that which is sought. For the 
ancients, the very idea of a method or set of rules would have 
seemed absurd, because they understood "rule" as something vital, 
live, for which no amount of theoretical knowledge could substi­
tute. And it is precisely because of the visible consequences of 
the vast gap between method and living rule that gifted children 
and primitive people are easily recognized as being closer to the 
mode of operation of the artist in whom habitus inheres, than are
laureates in whom it has yet to sprout.
Wherever it does exist, however, habitus has begun with an 
inborn disposition, a spontaneous instinct, rooted in the "physi­
cal disposition of the body", which concerns the faculties of the 
senses, in particular "the imagination, the chief purveyor of 
art . . . gift par excellence by which the artist is born . . . 
so intimately bound up with the activity of the creative intel­
lect that it is difficult in the concrete to distinguish the one
from the other" (41). Even so, the imprint on the mind made
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through that natural gift's cu1tivation to the point where it 
becomes habitus, is of "an incomparably deeper quality . . . "  
(41).
The depth of the imprint of the individual habitus largely 
depends on the philosophy and form of education, which may even 
"atrophy the spontaneous gift" (41) if it is "rotten with re­
cipes and clever devices," or "theoretical and speculative in­
stead of being operative" (42), for the practical intellect can 
only develop by positing effects in being, rather than proving or 
demonstrating. (So true is this that he in whom the habitus is 
most fully developed may be the least capable of articulating 
it. )
In his concern for the consequences in education of correct­
ly understanding habitus and the conditions most favorable for 
its development, Maritain asserts that since "art is a virtue of 
the practical intellect, the mode of teaching that by nature 
belongs to it is apprenticeship-education" (42) in which, exem- 
plarily, the teacher is a helper, at the service of "the interior 
principle, the intellectual light present in the pupil, which is, 
in the acquisition of science and art, the principle cause or 
principle agent" (44).
In any case, since the fine arts are in contact "with being
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and the transcendentais" (44), the student soon learns that the 
rules proper to them have peculiarities of their own_. In partial 
explication, Maritain says that because "beauty, like being, has 
an infinite amplitude" (44), it conflicts in a way with an 
artistic genus, by its nature incapable of exhausting all the 
possibilities for expressing beauty. Thus, the artist "creates", 
i.e., "discovers a new analogate of the beautiful, a new way in 
which the radiance of form can shine on matter" (45). This new 
way, incarnate in his work, escapes the boundaries of existing 
genera, creating automatically a new genus, requiring further 
adaptation of perennial rules.
In effecting this rupture, the artist as creator employs 
viae certae et determinatae, those paths through the thicket 
"adapted and personal to the artist and designed to disclose 
themselves to one man only" (43), which he himself has never 
before employed. In doing so, he simultaneously breaks rank with 
himself, disconcerting others in the process.
But it is at precisely such moments, when a break is effect­
ed, that the proper life of the fine arts manifests itself; "the 
contemplative activity [is] in contact with the transcendenta1" 
(45). As the new discovery, however, is exploited by "the merely 
operative activity [talent, cleverness, pure technique], little 
by little the genus exhausts itself, materializing formerly 
living and spiritual rules" (45). Change will once again be 
called for, a genius required, if art is to live. And art may not 
even be the better for a given change.
Maritain cites Rembrandt as a bad, though successful artist, 
and even if some believe that art declined in quality, in spirit­
uality, and in purity "from Bach to Beethoven and from Beethoven 
to Wagner" (45), Maritain does not question their necessity to
music, for "art has a fundamental need of novelty: like nature, 
it goes in seasons" (46).
In completing his discussion of art's rules, Maritain, in 
order to clarify the role of the appetite in art, once again 
turns to the analogy of the virtues of art and prudence. He 
reminds us that whereas straight appetite (which is the whole 
truth of the practical intellect) in prudence implies "the power 
of willing and loving, in relation to man's end or in the line of
morality" (46), in art its meaning refers only to the power to
12will and labor for the good of that which is created.
The appetite in the case of the fine arts, therefore, tends 
not towards beauty as general end, but towards the "particular 
end which rules [the artist's] present activity and in relation 
to which all the means must be ruled" (46). It is according to 
this specific end, this particular and original realization of 
beauty, that judgments must be made, in a process involving more 
than reason alone: "a good disposition of the appetite is [also] 
necessary, for everyone judges of his own ends in accordance with 
what he himself actually is" (46). Having based himself here on 
Aristotle^^ and Aquinas^^, Maritain goes on to affirm that the 
virtue of art by nature overflows from the intellect, into the 
sense faculties and imagination of the whole man, for
if all of the artist's powers of desire and emotion are 
not fundamentally straight and exalted in the line of 
beauty, whose transcendence and immateriality are 
superhuman, then human life and the humdrum of the 
senses, and the routine of art itself, will degrade his 
conception (47).
In a word, the artist must love what he is making, so that 
beauty may "inviscerate itself in him through affection . . . and 
his work may come forth from his heart and his bowels as well as
from his lucid spirit" (47). This unwavering love Maritain calls 
"the supreme rule" (47). But, he concludes, love presupposes 
intellect; without it love can do nothing, and, in tending to­
wards the beautiful, love in that same movement tends to what 
delights the intellect.
Although the nature of love and intellect do not vary, the 
mode of ruling matter changes with each new end proposed, which 
makes of prudence and the fine arts in this respect analogues of 
one another. However, it is also true that the viae certae et 
determinatae, the unique, immutable, most fundamental mode of 
expression characteristic of each artist, that which stamps all 
of, his vjorks alike, no matter how different among themselves, do 
not change.
As Maritain portrays him at work, the artist seems, in 
contrast with the paint-spattered, not infrequently outrageous 
figure of the popular imagination, more like a stealthy hunter. 
Proceeding with "prudence, eubulla, good sense and perspicacity, 
circumspection, precaution, deliberation, industry, memory, 
foresight, intelligence and divination" (47), the artist moves 
towards a new realization of beauty through the application of 
old and unchanging rules, in a way which he himself could not 
have foreseen. Only thus, says Maritain, is the ruling of the 
virtue of art infallible and, by way of suggesting the intensity 
of the struggle involved, he quotes Degas: "A painting is a thing 
which requires as much cunning, rascality and viciousness as the 
perpetration of a crime" (48).^^
Summing up his commentary on the rules of art, Maritain 
writes: "In the end, all the rules having become connatural to 
him, the artist seemingly has no other rule than to espouse at 
each moment the living contour of a unique and dominating intui­
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tive emotion that will never recur" (48). This activity is 
regulated by artistic prudence, which Maritain calls a "spiritual 
sensibility", in the absence of which, "to the extent that the 
rules of the Academy prevail, the fine arts revert to the generic 
type of art and to its lower species, the mechanical arts" (48).
1.6 The Purity of Art
The purpose of art, according to what Maritain calls "Aris­
totle's celebrated and generally misunderstood observation" (49) 
is to purify the passions. For their part, the Schoolmen purified 
the notion of beauty by stressing unceasingly the primacy of 
intellect, reason, as the first principle of all human works, 
including the work of art.^^ Maritain adds that since they estab­
lish Logic as the first among the liberal arts, the Schoolmen 
"are telling us that in every art there is a sort of lived par­
ticipation in Logic" (49), thus the ugliness of all clutter, 
e.g., in, archi tecture .
In stressing this point, Maritain cites Rodin: "Everything
in art is ugly which is false, which smiles without motive,
everything that is senseless affectation, everything that struts
and prances, everything that is but parade of beauty and grace,
everything that lies" (50).^^ For the truth of art, according to
the ancients through John of St. Thomas, is in its conformity to
1 srules which exclude such artifice. Therefore, says Maritain, 
al1 art
must be steeped in logic: not in the pseudo-logic of 
clear ideas, and not in the logic of knowledge and 
demonstration, but in working logic, always mysterious 
and disconcerting, the logic of the structure of the 
living and of the intimate geometry of nature. (50)
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In order to clarify better the difference between "pseudo­
logic" and the mysterious and disconcerting logic of living 
structures, Maritain recalls that "if the choir of a Romanesque 
church was destroyed by fire, they rebuilt it in Gothic, without 
further thought" (51), He also describes both the Su/77/77dJ of 
Aquinas and Notre-Dame de Chartres as marvels of logic, noting 
further that "flamboyant Gothic itself remains averse to veneer, 
and the extravagance in which it exhausts itself is that of the 
elaborate and torturous syllogisms of the period" (50).
As has been seen, according to Aquinas "the perfection of 
the virtue of art consists in the art of judging" (51). Thus, 
manual dexterity, although requisite, is as extrinsic to the 
virtue as it is to the habitus. In fact, says Maritain, as a 
muscular habit, capable of substituting for the guidance of the 
intellectual habitus, skill is a "permanent menace to art" (51) 
since it may block the influx of art from the intellect. Con­
versely, an awkward stroke may reveal the spiritual virtue at its 
source. Thus the charm of the primitive arts whose clumsiness is 
"a sacred weakness through which the subtle intellectuality of 
art reveals itself" (51). Thus, also, the wonder of the medieval 
cathedrals, no two halves of any one of which are symmetrica1, 
and whose technical problems were resolved ad hoc as they arose, 
by artists/artisans working without benefit of plans on paper 
(none existed, and vellum was rare and costly), comfortably set 
out well in advance, and all the other accoutrements of their 
successors.
In a time of plenitude of material means, and progress in 
scientific technique, the previously well-worn road of access to 
the dwelling place of the habitus has sprouted weeds that flour­
ish freely because, says Maritain, man is by nature inclined to
living In sensibus anyway. In his opinion, "beyond a certain 
limit, whatever removes a constraint removes a source of 
strength, and whatever removes a difficulty removes a source of 
grandeur" (58). And, in fact, who bothers to expend energy in 
search for hidden solutions, and the riches they may contain, 
when effortless ones are at hand?
Just as Maritain celebrates the works of medieval 
artists/artisans as examples of the results of habitus cultivated 
to plenitude, so does he lament an aesthetically contrary devel­
opment in sixteenth century art which, paraphrasing his own 
words, may be called the installation of the lie, signifying that 
painting, infatuated with science, adopted imitation as its 
ultimate aim and endeavored "to give the illusion of nature and 
to make us believe that in the presence of a painting we are in 
the presence of the scene or the subject painted, not in the 
presence of a painting" (52). Maritain points out that such 
great classicists as Raphael (1483-1520), Greco (1541-1614), and 
Watteau (1684-1721) succeeded in purifying art of this lie in 
which, Maritain says, the realists and to a certain extent the 
impressionists, delighted.
As another example of fundamental repudiation of the lie, he 
points to Cubism, which "despite its enormous deficiencies"
(52), "recalled painting to itself" by recalling it "to the 
essential exigencies of art in general" (53). He says that a few 
of its practitioners demonstrate "the most noteworthy effort 
towards the logical coherence and the simplicity and purity of 
means that properly constitute the veracity of art" (53).
Maritain claims that the issue "rather violently posed" by 
Cubism is exactly that of imitation which, as has been seen, is 
precisely what art is not. For art consists in making, "in ac­
cordance with the law of the very object to be posited in being"
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(53). Therefore art is destroyed when imitation is conceived of 
as its essential end.
And here the name of Plato enters the discussion, he who, 
because of his theory of imitation, misconstrued, "like all 
exaggerated intellectuals" (53), the nature of art, and conse­
quently held poetry in contempt. Rightly so, says Maritain, for 
"if art were a means of science, it would be tremendously inferi­
or to geometry" (53).
It is nevertheless true that imitation bears a relation to 
art which, although the latter was no doubt prompted by "the 
pleasure of reproducing an object with exactness" (54) in the 
reindeer age when man traced animal forms on cavern walls, has 
long since undergone a process of purification, by which that 
original joy of imitation has been modified. For fine art aims at 
producing "the joy or delight of the intellect through the intui­
tion of the sense" (54). But the intellect's delight in this 
case stems from the perception of beauty, and is therefore dif­
ferent from that proportioned by the true (occasioned by success­
ful imitation), or by the simple act of knowing.
The delight specific to the perception of fine art, as has 
been seen, overflows in the act of recognizing beauty through the 
intuition of the senses, "when the object upon which [the act of 
knowing] bears is well proportioned for the intellect" (54). It 
is a delight, therefore, which presupposes knowledge, an increase 
in which implies increased possibility of delight, which (Marit­
ain steadfastly insists) does not "at all depend on the perfec­
tion of imitation as reproduction of the real, or on the exact­
ness of representation" (55).
Thus imitation, like manual dexterity, bears a relation to 
art, although not constituting it. Similarly, the sensible signs
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of art (words, meters, rhymes and rhythms, masses and forms, 
etc.): these are only material, therefore remote, elements of the 
beauty of a work of art, which must still be intelligibly ar­
ranged by the artist, and on which he must yet "make shine the 
radiance of a form" (56).
For this reason, when he restricts his aim to material 
imitation, the artist enslaves himself to a lesser god because, 
with respect to reality, art is by nature sovereign, concerned 
exclusively with manifesting her hallmark; form. When the artist 
successfully imitates this, he is simultaneously constituting 
that formal element of art by which is expressed some secret 
principle of intelligibility. Shining forth on suitably propor—  
tioned matter, it is this secret principle which according to 
Maritain "gives art its value of universality" (57).
Continuing his discussion on the relation between beauty and 
the intellect, Maritain observes that when the intellect rejoices 
in the presence of a beautiful work, discourse is absent, for the 
radiance of form suggests rather than reveals, expressing what is 
beyond the power of ideas to signify. Nevertheless, in the case 
of the visual arts, which involve the most cognitive of the 
powers of knowing (intellect and sight), "a stricter necessity of 
imitation or signification imposes itself extrinsically" (58). 
Intellect and sight, because they are "most drawn to the object, 
cannot experience complete joy if they do not know, in a suffi­
ciently lively manner, some object — doubtless a sign itself in 
its turn - which is signified to them by mass, color, or words"
(58).
One or another aspect of the work must therefore be legible 
and, Maritain points out, between a clear and an obscure poem, if 
the poetic value is equal, the soul will derive more enjoyment 
from the first. For, although clarity and obscurity are condi­
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tions formally extrinsic to art, "if the obscurity becomes too 
great, if the signs are no longer but enigmas, the nature of our 
faculties protests" (58). It is, then, within the range short of 
imitation, at one extreme, and of utter obscurity, at the other, 
that the artist operates, doing his necessary violence to nature.
Returning to the subject of form, since, as we have seen, 
"the imitative arts aim neither at copying the appearances of 
nature, nor at depicting the 'ideal', but at making an object 
beautiful by manifesting a form with the help of sensible signs"
(59), the next question is: from whence does form derive? Answers 
Maritain, "first and above all [from] the immense treasure house 
of created things, [from] sensible nature as also [from] the 
world of souls, and [from] the interior world of [the artist's] 
own sou1" (59).
Certainly the artist's power of sight is more penetrating 
than most, for, as Rodin put it, "His eye grafted on his heart 
reads deep into the bosom of nature" (195),^*^ acquiring thereby 
an existential knowledge of forms and secrets to which he is 
"docile and faithful" and which cannot be expressed unless he 
"[distorts] in some measure, [reconstructs, transfigures] the 
material appearances of nature" (60). In this way what is ex­
pressed, even in a portrait perfectly resembling its subject, is 
"a form engendered in the spirit of the artist and truly born in 
that spirit" (60).
Through a "spiritual marriage" joining "the activity of the 
artist to the passivity of a given matter" (60), a new creature 
is born, the work of art, which is capable of affecting other 
souls. In his role, therefore, the artist imitates the Creator, 
whose work, rather than copying, he continues in his own. For 
just as God is stamped in creation, so is the artist in his work.
30
his conception having emerged from within his soul.
The artist, says Maritain, is the pupil of God, as well as 
of the masters who preceded him, thus he cherishes and bases 
himself upon nature "because it is a derivation of the divine art 
in things" (61). And what he imitates in nature is "the creative 
agility of the spirit" (61). Or, as Degas, put it, "the model is 
there only to set me on fire, to enable me to do things that I 
could not invent without it. . . . And [I fail] if I throw myself 
too much into it" ( 6 1 ) . In other words, the function of the 
artist is, far from copying nature or expressing himself, to 
imitate a quality of the spirit.
If art must defend itself against slavish imitation or the 
ascendancy of manual dexterity, it is also threatened when the 
artist's first concern is creating a beauty which merely pleases, 
aimed above all at arousing emotion. For, as we have seen, the 
highest delight experienced in the presence of art is that of the 
soul. Therefore, any intention, no matter how well meant, which 
is extrinsic to the work and yet acts directly on it, escaping 
expression through the habitus, renders the work impure, because 
[it] prevents the work of art from springing from the 
heart . . . spontaneously like a ripened fruit; it 
betrays a calculation, a duality between the intellect 
of the artist and his sensibility, which two, art . . . 
wants to see united. (63)
Here, Maritain ringingly declares: "I resist an emotion 
which [another] will . . . seeks to impose on me" (63). Reject­
ing manipulation, what he seeks to share with the artist is, 
having contemplated the object laid before him, "the emotion 
which in him and me springs from a same beauty, from a same 
transcendental which we communicate" (63). And to exemplify the 
artistic spirit which makes this experience possible, Maritain
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cites the cathedral builders, who he claims harbored no theses, 
nor did their work with an eye to arousing pious emotion or 
demonstrating "the propriety of Christian dogma" (63), and who 
"even thought a great deal less of making a beautiful work than 
of doing good work" (63). As this was their sole concern, says 
Maritain, their work reveals God's truth.
1.7 The Problem of Christian Art
Christian art, says Maritain, can only be defined "by the 
one in whom it exists and by the spirit from whom it issues"
(65). It is "the art of redeemed humanity . . . [which is] at 
home wherever the ingenuity and the joy of man extend" (65). 
Maritain concedes its difficulty, fourfold he says, because to be 
an artist is not easy, nor is being a Christian, and the total 
difficulty is the result of one multiplied by the other. Compli­
cating the matter further, since the artist is affected by the 
spirit of the times, when these are not Christian the challenge 
is that much greater. On the other hand, however, Christian art 
is found wherever purity exists in art, which is therefore 
(regardless of its cultural roots) Christian in its hope, because 
"every spiritual radiance is a promise and a symbol of the divine 
harmonies" (66).
Such art, says Maritain, proceeds not from the Muses, but 
from God, and is a "symbol of supernatural inspiration" (66). At 
God's pleasure the artist's inspiration is conceded through the 
soul, about which Maritain observes that "nothing is more acces­
sible to supra-human influences, to inspiration properly so- 
called (whether of the natural or of the supernatural order) than 
this fluid and violent world" (211). (Maritain does not distin­
Based on these considerations, Maritain concludes that to 
make a Christian work of art it is necessary to be a Christian, 
bent on fashioning a "beautiful work, into which [one's] heart 
will pass" (66). As for dissociating the art from Christ, that 
is impossible anyway, providing art has not been isolated from 
the soul "by some system of aesthetics" (66). Ideally, when a 
Christian artist is at work, the product is one only, ruled by 
the undivided soul, creating through the habitus. On the other 
hand, "if [he] were to make of [his] aesthetic an article of 
faith, [he] would spoil [his] faith . . . [or if he] were to 
turn desire to edify into a method of [his] art, [he] would spoil 
[his] art" (66).
For Maritain, two conditions guarantee Christian beauty in 
art: right disposition of the appetite with respect to the beauty 
of the work, and Christ's presence through love in the artist's 
soul. Thus, "the quality of the work [becomes] the reflection of 
the love from which it issues and which moves the virtue of art 
instrumentally" (67). The more vibrant the love, the more Chris­
tian the art. In fact, says Maritain, "Christian work would have 
the artist, as man, a saint" (67). And, of course, what can 
issue from such soil could never be summed up in technique or 
rules. Anything, an infinity of forms, is possible.
But where are such artists? According to Maritain, they can 
only be found in the great stream of contemporary art from which, 
for as long as their effort does not "spring spontaneously from a 
common renewal of art and sanctity in the world" (69), it cannot 
be separated.
Maritain readily concedes that art is not made easier by 
being Christian for, as we have seen, this very condition impedes 
its access "to many facile means" (69). But, argues Maritain
guish the sub-conscious from the soul.)
(reiterating what he has previously observed about the relation­
ship between constraint and strength, difficulty and grandeur), 
while this fact on one hand complicates matters, on the other it 
forces into existence new levels of beauty, "more delicious than 
light . . . [giving art] what artists need most . . . - simplici­
ty, the peace that renders matter docile to men and fraternal" 
(69) .
1.8 The Relationship between Art and Morality
Maritain makes a distinction between artist/man in the 
relation of the one person to the work-to-be-made. For the art­
ist, morality does not bear upon what he is creating. Of course, 
the use for which the object is intended imposes requirements 
which the work must satisfy, because without respecting them, 
proportion (as we have "seen, one of the elements of beauty) would 
be lacking. But even so, for the artist qua man who wields the 
brush or labors with the chisel (or at the typewriter or any 
other means of expression) the work can never be an end in it­
self, since as its creator is a moral being in the specifically 
Christian sense, his beatitude is to be found in the vision of 
God, to whom his work must always represent a closer approxima­
tion in love. While his art, nevertheless, is as sovereign as 
wisdom in its own domain, it simultaneously exists in and is 
freely used by the subject man and is accordingly "subordinate to 
the end of man and to the human virtues" (71). For this reason, 
says Maritain, it is subject to an "extrinsic control, imposed in 
the name of a higher end which is the very beatitude of the 
living being in whom it resides" (71). This control is assumed 
to be exercised naturally, since "the law has become the [Chris­
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tian artist's] own interior inclination" (71) and, consequently, 
to him nothing offensive to God could be conceived of as beauti­
ful .
Maritain here introduces an analogy between the two aspects 
of control exercised by the artist/man over his work and, basing 
himself on Aristotle^^ and Aquinas^^, the dual control imposed on 
an army, first by its own intrinsic order and second, that im­
posed by its commander, which determines movement and is ordered 
to victory. Since the first aspect of order is subordinate to the 
second, the latter is the nobler of the two.
To these two aspects, Maritain also compares what he calls 
"the social common good", which is the province and aim of the 
engineer, tradesman, etc., and the superior common good of the 
universe, i.e., "God", properly the concern of the artist and 
metaphysician. Thus, their superiority: in touch as they are with 
the transcendental order of beauty and truth, the service they 
render to the community is greater than that of the engineer and 
the tradesman.
In the specific case of the artist, while his noble function 
does not necessarily demand that he isolate himself from the 
city, or exclude human aims from his work, his main responsibili­
ty is, therefore, through the strength of his habitus, to "domi­
nate [in every case] his matter without losing anything of its 
loftiness and purity, and to aim, in the very act of making, at 
the sole good of the work, without being turned aside or dis­
tracted by the human ends pursued" (73).
Thus, although from his normal and indispensable interaction 
with the surrounding community and environment the artist both 
finds the matter of his work and arrives at certain proximate 
human ends, which the work itself cannot disregard, he must at 
the same time be able to distinguish clearly between what as
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workman he is aiming for, as opposed to what the work, as it is 
being brought into being, requires for its own beauty. However, a 
distinction cannot be made in practice between the workman and 
the artist. The purity of the work, therefore, depends on the 
force of the habitus which reconciles both the aesthetic demands 
and human, end of the work.
As for the distinction between art and the material condi­
tion from which it arises, although on the one hand transcendent 
as the spirit and unbounded as the beautiful, art resides ini­
tially in an incarnate soul which, in contact with a specific 
human society, pace by pace over long seasons, gradually matures. 
Influenced by history and tradition, the offshoot of a given time 
and place, art itself (no less than the artist) is a creature of 
time. And the deeper the mark of the natural environment on art, 
the more universal it is, this property (along with all the other 
spiritual virtues) threatened only when a given nation becomes a 
"metaphysical and religious cult [seeking] to enslave the intel­
lect to the physiology of a race or to [its own] interests"
(75).
This is so because art is a function of values, which are
determined by that value which is highest, the god-in-effect. If
that value is spiritual, progress (defined by Aquinas as the
■23tending of any nature in the direction of its Principle ) will 
ultimately be likewise spiritual, i.e., a movement from lesser 
towards greater ends which express ever greater spiritual values: 
"to civilize is to spiritualize" (75).
Of course, material progress may or may not be at the serv­
ice of this higher progress and, therefore, may or may not bene­
fit art. If employed for the soul's leisure, the peace which is 
the condition for contemplation and its fruit, greater spiritual-
ization results and greater possibilities exist for the flourish­
ing of art. But in the service of unrefined human nature and its 
characteristically blind passions, i.e., the will to power, or 
greed, which is by nature insatiable, progress propels both art 
and the world itself toward dissolution.
In any case, however, art is indispensable to the human 
community. For, as Aquinas (following Aristotle) wrote: "nobody 
can do without delectation for long. That is why he who is de­
prived of spiritual delectations goes over to the carnal"
(75).^^ And because art begins in the sensible, and thus by 
nature adapted to the requirements of man, it is most able to 
lead him beyond itself, in the direction of the spiritual, even
preparing him remotely for contemplation which in the view of
25Aquinas seems to be the end of all human operations.
As for the problem of classifying artists and their works, 
Maritain maintains that a hierarchy of different types of art is 
feasible only from the "human point of view of their properly 
civilizing value, or of their degree of spirituality" (76). Thus 
his own list begins with Holy Scripture and the Liturgy, going 
down through the writings of the mystics to "art properly so- 
called: the spiritual fullness of mediaeval art, the rational 
harmony of Greek and classical art, the pathos-laden harmony of 
Shakespearean art" (76). Even romanticism, tainted for Maritain 
by its "deep-seated lack of balance and its intellectual indi­
gence" (76), as the "instinct of the heart" maintains the con­
cept of art through its imaginative and verbal richness. As for 
naturalism, for a time almost devoid of the concept of art, it 
then reappears, "cleansed and sharpened, with new values" (71).
When he discusses the demands on the artist himself, if the 
high ends of increased spiritualization and "remote preparation 
for contemplation" are to be reached, Maritain warns that these
37
are by no means trivial. For the artist must submit to a type of 
asceticism which does not exclude the possibility of heroic 
sacrifice. He must be ruthless in the service of the ends of his 
art, consciously resisting at every turn the "banal attraction of 
easy execution and success" (78), and unwavering in the cultiva­
tion of his habitus which, however strong, never ceases to be 
delicate in its dependence on the constancy of the acts which are 
its only sap. The vitality of the habitus demands, furthermore, 
that the artist subject himself spiritually to a nomadic exist­
ence, ever in search of more difficult terrain, once the fertili­
ty of a previous one has been demonstrated in the fruit he has 
enabled it to yield. Insecurity is what the artist must seek, 
barren land.
With respect to his art, major virtues are indispensable; 
"humility and magnanimity, prudence, integrity, fortitude, tem­
perance, simplicity, ingenuousness" (78). Thus it happens that, 
in speaking or writing of his work, the artist "easily takes on 
the tone of a moralist" (78), for his existence as artist de­
pends on the preservation of a virtue. Or, as Jean Cocteau put 
it, "We shelter in ourselves an Angel whom we constantly shock.
We must be the guardians of this angel. Shelter well your virtue" 
(78).
However, as a man, the artist must at the same time recog­
nize in his work not an end in itself but a creature like him­
self, existing ever in relation to the Ultimate Good. In fact, it 
is only from this standpoint that the Prudent Man, for his part, 
is qualified to judge art at all (79). His concern with art is 
from morality's angle, i.e., as it relates to the good of man. 
With respect to art, that is where his competence ends.
In connection with his comment on the Prudent Man, Maritain
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calls attention to the fact that Prudence as a moral virtue is
superior to art which, however, because it aims at beauty and
therefore resembles the speculative virtues is more splendid
intellectually and superior metaphysically. According to Aquinas,
this is so because speculative virtues are ends in themselves,
'21and not ordered to any use.
For Maritain, while Art is sovereign with respect to its 
objects (unlike science, which is subject to wisdom), with re­
spect to the human subject Prudence has sole domain. Therefore, 
over Art's objects both Art and Prudence have legitimate claims: 
one from the point of view of poetic or working values, the other 
from that of human values and moral regulation of the free act. 
Correct valuation of a given work requires the judgment of both 
Art and Prudence. But, again, the acts of each proceed from 
distinct sets of values.
Maritain, having discussed the relation between the Artist 
and the Prudent Man, then observes that the Contemplative and the 
Artist, having more in common, are less likely to have difficulty 
understanding one another. Sharing the intellectual nature of 
their respective virtues, they are consequently bound to the 
transcendental order.
Since it is the business of the contemplative to seek the 
first cause in things, inevitably he is an intimate of beauty, 
understanding by connatura1ity the artist. And, reciproca11y , at 
least by intuition the artist will recognize in the contemplative 
a spiritual kinsman. In fact, dedicated as the artist is to 
beauty, regardless of the moral quality of his life he is "ori­
ented in the direction of subsisting Beauty" (80) by the nature 
of his habitus.
This same habi tus, however, by no means guarantees the 
artist smooth relations with the Prudent Man, for concerning
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overlapping claims of Art and Prudence, clashes can only be 
eliminated completely by Wisdom, which judges from the point of 
view of God, for whom Doing and Making exist side by side, in the 
harmony of the lion and lamb of Isaiah's prophecy. But man is 
imperfect in Wisdom, at which he can only aim. Therefore, perfect 
reconciliation is not always attained, as in the time of the 
Italian Renaissance, when Prudence was sacrificed to Art, and of 
the nineteenth century, when "right-thinking" circles, having 
made of Respectability the supreme value, did precisely the 
opposite. And it is here that, without summary or conclusion, as 
if Maritain were temporarily stopping a discussion shortly to be 
continued. Art and Scholasticism ends.
1.9 Summary
From the standpoint of Jacques Maritain and the thinkers he 
represents. Art, while pertaining to the practical order and 
directed towards action, is equally an intellectual quality which 
rules making and results from constant work. This quality, ac­
cording to context termed either "virtue" or "habitus", neces­
sarily precedes in order of existence the work of art itself.
As a quality, a subsisting modification of the intellect, 
art's characteristic act is judging, in which it is infallible. 
But art's infallibility does not guarantee that the power to make 
will itself be properly used, a determination which depends on 
the disposition of the will.
For the ancients, no distinction was made between art and 
the fine arts, except that, insofar as the latter required bodily 
labor, they were considered to be servile, as opposed to the 
liberal arts, the products of which result from exclusively
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mental labor. To arrive at the category of fine art, Maritain 
therefore relies on Aquinas's first definition of beauty, which 
is by its effects.
For Aquinas, beauty is that which, when seen, pleases.
Thus, beauty is first grasped intuitively, through the senses.
But the ultimate delight occasioned by the perception of beauty 
is the intellect's which, for Aquinas, is a result of the simi­
larity between (1) the "light" emanating from the materialization 
in things of three qualities: integrity, proportion, and radi­
ance, and (2) the "light" of the intellect itself.
Besides being that which, when seen, pleases, and the sum of 
certain qualities incarnate in objects, beauty is also an object 
of thought, a transcendental which, when materialized in an art 
object, becomes a place of encounter between matter and spirit, 
like man himself.
Art, that in which beauty resides, is an end in itself, 
ordered to the transcendent object beauty, and by nature destined 
to produce delight. But equally, since it belongs to the order of 
making, art demands drudgery among bodies, full immersion in the 
human condition. The marks of this humble origin, limiting abso­
lutely what can be expected of art's fruit as sources of delight, 
are indelible in each work. Furthermore, in the same way that the 
product of his work cannot exceed a certain level of perfection, 
the highest condition to which the artist himself can legitimate­
ly aspire is to be a good workman. If this condition is met, the 
product of his labor will be beautiful.
The rules of art are neither fixed nor conventional impera­
tives, but ways of operating peculiar to art itself, hidden modes 
of working reason inhering in the habitus, paths discernible only 
as the artist proceeds. They are his tools; vital, live, to be 
confused with neither taste nor method.
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As for the habitus, it originates in the "physical disposi­
tion of the body", manifesting itself as a spontaneous instinct, 
Whatever else this inheritance may encompass, the main element, 
the gift par excellence, is the imagination, whose consistent 
activity is synonymous with the development of the habitus.
Because art is a virtue of the practical intellect, it must 
be trained by positing effects in being and is, therefore, best 
developed through apprenticeship. But in addition it requires: 1) 
knowing the tradition of the discipline; 2) education by the 
masters; and 3) the experience of the continuity in time of human 
collaboration.
When the artist succeeds in creating a new analogate of 
beauty, in that very act he is breaking with a previously exist­
ing artistic genus. Moreover, it is at this exact point that the 
proper life of the fine arts manifests itself, i.e., contempla­
tive creativity in contact with the transcendent.
As the artist goes about his work, his appetite must be 
directed solely by the good of that which he is making, rather 
than towards the creation of beauty as an end in itself. Of 
course, the good of the work varies with each new end proposed, 
an end by which he must allow himself to be guided as he rules 
his matter. But an artist's characteristic mode of expression is 
as unvarying as his fingerprint.
In every art there is a "lived participation in logic", 
corresponding to the intellect's foremost role in each human 
work. In fact, the very perfection of the virtue of art is in the 
act of judging, as opposed to mere manual dexterity, which is 
extrinsic to the habitus. So true is this that, beyond a certain 
point, progress in technique and material means may actually 
thwart the development of habitus, by eliminating the constraints
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that are the sources of strength.
Another threat to art is imitation, which endangers the 
simplicity, logical coherence, and purity of means which are the 
veracity of art. The only element legitimately imitated by an 
artist is form, that agility of the spirit which is lost when 
what is sought first is to please, to arouse emotion. The capaci­
ty of an individual to perceive form, to experience delight in a 
work of art, depends on his knowledge; the greater it is, the 
greater the delight. But the possibility for delight also depends 
on the intelligibility of the form. When excessively obscure, the 
faculties protest.
Christian art is defined solely by the spirit from which it 
proceeds. Therefore all art characterized by purity is, regard­
less of its cultural roots, Christian in its hope. Such art, 
supernaturally inspired, is symbolic of the Divine from whence it 
ultimately springs. By this same token, it is condemned from the 
start if the artist makes of a system of aesthetics an article of 
faith, or succumbs to the desire to edify.
Art is sovereign in its own domain, but since it exists in 
and is freely used by man, it is subordinate to man's own end, 
and to the human virtues. Within this broader context, it is thus 
not an end in itself. Therefore, in the process of dominating his 
matter, the artist must lose sight neither of the requirements of 
the work, nor of what he as workman requires. Possible conflicts 
between the two must be resolved by the habitus.
Art is transcendent as the spirit and unbounded as the 
beautiful, but also, like the artist himself, both time- and 
place-bound. Thus, like man himself. Art is mortally threatened 
by enforced ideologies and nations-as-cults, i.e., imposed abso­
lutes, for art is a function of values and depends, therefore, on 
the god-in-effect. But in any case, art is indispensable because
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man's nature demands delight, and if none of a spiritual nature 
are available, lesser ones will be found.
The artist's mission is to assist his fellow man in attain­
ing to higher realms of spirituality, by proportioning him oppor­
tunities for experiencing delight. Such an exalted mission, and 
the requirements of art itself, demand of the artist a certain 
asceticism: he must 1) resist easy success; 2) unwaveringly 
cultivate his habitus', and 3) constantly seek uncultivated 
ground, in spite of the concomitant insecurity.
Finally, the artist, in spite of his lofty mission, charac­
terized as it is by contact in his work with the transcendental, 
must recognize in its product a simple fellow creature which, 
like himself, the artist-as-man, is ultimately subject to the 
dictates of prudence.
1.10 Conclusion
Art and Scholasticism ends abruptly, mid-topic, as if short­
ly to be continued in the established rhythm. But, exactly as it 
was, the relatively brief text had been sufficiently impressive 
for Flannery Q'Connor to have recommended it repeatedly, with 
unbridled enthusiasm.
Before going on to her own writings, one thinks of some 
questions for which Maritain's essay may have provided satisfac­
tory answers: what is art; what is an artist; how is he to be 
taught; how does an artist work; what rules does he follow; what 
is his relationship with his environment; what is his objective; 
from whence does his inspiration arise?
In Mystery and Manners. O'Connor writes: "Art is a word 
that immediately scares people off, as being a little too grand"
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(65), and it certainly seems not unlikely that, to have made such, 
an observation at all, she had at one time counted herself among 
their number. If this is so, we may imagine that, as she accompa­
nied Jacques Maritain through the steps of his dialectic, both 
the sublime and the earthbound faces of art were showing them­
selves ever more clearly, at the same time progressively sapping 
the word "art" of its power to intimidate. One may conclude that, 
at the end of her reading, the questions which 0'Connor 1 ike 1y 
had had— and perhaps felt were common to many— had been satisfac­
torily answered.
For, as Art and Scholasticism makes clear, who is an artist 
if not everyman insofar as he goes about his daily work single- 
mindedly, with unmeasured painstaking making whatever it may be? 
Thus, Maritain's synthesis in effect amounts to (at least from 
the point of view of those who may require one) a demystifica­
tion, rendering "artist" and "art" friendly words, pedestrian 
even, to be applied with confidence to all who make with care, to 
be used with ease by all with an eye for that which is well-made, 
and a desire to talk about it.
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Note'
(1) Throughout Art and Scholasticism "art" is capitalized or not 
according to a criterion which appears to have been highly per­
sonal. Maritain's usage, however, has been respected in the 
paraphrasing.
(2) Metaphysics, Bk. II, 995 b 21, ctd. in Maritain.
(3) II Metaphysics, lect. 2., ctd. in Maritain.
(4) Summa theologiae, I-II, 55, 3, ctd. in Maritain.
(5) Summa theologiae, I-II, 55, 3, a. 2, ad 1, ctd. in Maritain.
(6) Cursus Theol., q. 62, disp. 16, a. 4, ctd. in Maritain.
(7) Summa, theologiae I-II, 57, 3, ctd. in Maritain.
(8) Summa theologiae, I-II, 57, 4, cited in Maritain.
(9) Aristotle, Eth. Nie., VI, ctd. in Maritain.
(10) Summa theologiae, I-II, 27, 1, ad 3, qtd. in Maritain.
(11) Summa theologiae. I, 39, 8, ctd. in Maritain.
(12) Cajetan, IN 1-11, 5 ad 3, ctd. in Maritain.
(13) Eth. Nie., Ill, 7, 1114 a 32, ctd. in Maritain.
(14) Commentary, lect. 13; Summa theologiae I, 83, 1, ad 5, ctd- 
in Maritain.
(15) Qtd. by Etienne Charles in Renaissance de I'Art français et 
des industries de luxe. No. 2, April, 1918; reqtd. by Maritain.
(16) Summa theologiae, 58, 2, ctd. in Maritain
(17) CSuoted in Rodin (Paris: Grasset, 1911), edited by Paul 
Gsell; reqtd. in Maritain.
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(18) Curs, theol., t. VI, q. 62, disp. 16. a. 4, ctd. in Marit­
ain .
(19) Quoted in Rodin (Paris: Grasset, 1911); reqtd. in Maritain 
195.
(20) Quoted by Albert Andre in his book Renoir (Paris: Cres, 
1919); reqtd. in Maritain.
(21) Met., XII, 10, 1075 a 15, ctd. in Maritain,
(22) Commentary, lect. 12. Cf. Summa theol., I-II, 111, 5, ad 1, 
ctd. in Maritain.
(23) Thomas Aquinas, In II Sent., d. 18 q. 2,2, ctd, in Marit­
ain.
(24) Summa theologiae, II-II, 35, 4, ad 2, qtd. in Maritain 75,
(25) Summa contra Gent., Ill, 37, ctd. in Maritain.
(26) Le Coq et 1 'Arlequin, 1918 (Le Rappel a 1 'Ordre, Pari; 
Stock, 1926), qtd. in Maritain.
(27) Summa theologiae, I-II, 66, a. 3, ad 1, ctd. in Maritain.
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Chapter II: Echoes of Art and Scholasticistn 
in O'Connor's Essays, Letters, and Interviews
A reading of Flannery O'Connor's Mystery and Manners proves 
to be a reencounter with a great number of the ideas expressed in 
Art and Scholasticism. Of course, the idiom greatly differs: 
typically terse, consistently chaste, effectively employing 
simple words to express what O'Connor had to say, none of which 
was either academic or trite, nor unnoticed by her contempo­
raries.
Of the most concentrated source of her comments and reflec­
tions on art, the essays compiled in Mystery and Manners. Freder­
ick Asals writes in Critica1 Essays on F 1annery 0'Connor: "[They 
are] direct and unpretentious", as well as being "free from cant 
and filled with quiet assurance". Furthermore, "[they] often 
[glow] with her finest awareness". "Unlike Faulkner," concludes 
Asals, "she did not (to use the polite term) 'mythologize' her 
role or her works in her remarks on them" (50).
For Saul Maloff, a contributor to the same book, O'Connor in 
Mystery and Manners showed herself
as a writer of fiction reflecting on craft and art who 
in perfect confidence took herself and her work as 
sufficient instances of general problems about which 
universal assertions can be made, and when, in viola­
tion, almost, of her native temperament, she addressed 
herself to more theoretic questions - of regionalism, 
of being a Southern writer, of the 'grotesque' in 
fiction, and especially of the vexed problem of reli­
gious belief, particularly Catholic belief and its
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relations to literature - she did so, one feels, as much 
because no on,e else could, or cared to, as because of 
the great pressures they exerted upon her as she prac­
ticed and sought to perfect her distinctive, recalci- 
tran t art. (54)
Maloff further states that Mystery and Manners is "a steady 
expansion of implication and statement to the point where the 
ideas essential to her life and art gathered towards the makings 
of something like a system" (54), reminiscent therefore of what 
Aquinas, Aristotle, and the ancients had done, in the texts that 
Maritain sifted as he elaborated the project which became Art and 
Scholasticism.
But, of course, O'Connor was writing in the twentieth cen­
tury, so we may expect fresh mintings of ideas of ancient line­
age, updatings that the passage of time and the evolution of 
thought make inevitable. For example, habitus, that frequently 
found word denoting a venerable concept, consistently italicized 
in Art and Scholasticism to distinguish it from "habit" by empha­
sizing its purely intellectual nature: with customary lack of 
ceremoniousness, O'Connor simply replaces it with "habit", e.g., 
"What interests the serious writer is not external habits but 
what Maritain calls, 'the habit of art'; and he explains that 
'habit' in this sense means a certain quality or virtue of the 
mind" (MM 64-65).^
As the reader may observe, in this chapter the order of the 
subjects considered approximates the order in which they appear 
in Maritain's work.
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Flannery O'Connor's art was fiction writing, one which she 
perceived as misunderstood by not a few: "people don't know what 
they are expected to do with a novel, believing, as so many do, 
that art must be utilitarian, that it must do somethingj rather 
than be something" (MTI 123). Connor's understanding of her own 
branch of art clearly differs: "all I mean by art is writing 
something that is valuable in itself and works in itself. The 
basis of art is truth, both in matter and mode. The person who 
aims after art in his work aims after truth, in an imaginative 
sense, no more and no less" (65).
The first part of this statement obviously accords with 
Maritain's text: "the work to which fine arts tend is ordered to 
beauty; as beautiful, it is an end, an absolute, it suffices of 
itself" (A&S 33).^ However, a difference seems to arise when 
O'Connor states that the artist "aims after truth" imaginatively. 
Is his aim not "the good of the work", and is truth not the 
province of the speculative, rather than the practical, intel­
lect? But Maritain had also distinguished between "the truth of 
the speculative intel1ect, which consists in knowing, in conform­
ity with what is, and the truth of the practical intellect, which 
consists is directing, in conformity with what ought to be ac­
cording to the rule and measure of the thing to be effected"
(13). Thus, "the truth of the practical intellect" refers to a 
mode of procedure, and concisely expresses the entire process of 
bringing about the good of the work.
But, before being either a mode of procedure or an object, 
according to O'Connor art is a habit, and fiction writing, like 
all other arts, .
is something in which the whole personality takes part
2.1 On Art and the Habit of Art
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- the conscious as well as the unconscious mind. Art is 
the habit of the artist; and habits have to be rooted 
deep in the whole personality. They have to be culti­
vated . . . over a long period of time, by 
experience . . . .  I think that [the habit of art] is a 
way of looking at the created world and of using the 
senses so as to make them find as much meaning as 
possible in things. ( 1 0 1 )
Here, although she begins by citing what haritain calls "the 
habit of art", O'Connor demonstrates her own earthy understanding 
of what Maritain goes to such lengths to restrict to the realm of 
the spiritual, calling it as he variously does "[a] metaphysical 
[title] of nobility", an "intrinsic [superelevation] of living 
spontaneity", a "vital [development] . . . which [fills the soul] 
with an active sap" (A&S 11).
Such definitions make it possible to qualify habitus as 
infallible, irrespective of its visible product, because they 
refer exclusively to the formal element, i.e., the regulation by 
the mind, of the work. Whatever imperfections the final product 
may present will have to be ascribed by Maritain's reckoning to 
"the hand", i.e., the body or material conditions of art's pro­
duction (A&S 13).
For her part, O'Connor agrees that art is a habit, and call­
ing it that, rather than habitus, in no way seems to make it less 
pivotal and operative, in spite of "[residing] in the nerve 
centers" and "[attesting] the weight of matter" ( m  11).
2.2 On the Function of Reason in Art
Maritain's text emphasizes that art's characteristic act is
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to judge. According to O'Connor, for the writer of fiction one of 
the judgments that this act characteristica11y translates into is 
the selection of detail, which must be not the "simple, mechani­
cal piling-up of detail" but rather an accumulation controlled by 
"some overall purpose, and every detail has to be put to 
work . . . .  Art is selective. What is there is essential" (MM 
93 ) .
O'Connor cites strictly naturalistic works of fiction as 
loci of detail used because "it is natural to life, not because 
it is natural to the work", as opposed to the use of detail in 
genuine works of art, where "we can be extremely literal, without 
being in the least naturalistic. [For the truthfulness of art] is 
the truthfulness of the essential" (MM 70). The writer of fic­
tion, therefore, must steadfastly draw a line between detail 
expressing the essential which is "natural to the work", and 
clutter.
But the act of selection extends to every small item em­
ployed in the construction of a fiction:
The novelist makes his statements by selection, and if 
he is any good, he selects every word for a reason, 
every detail for a reason, every incident for a reason, 
and arranges them in a certain time-sequence for a 
reason. He demonstrates something that cannot be demon­
strated any other way than with a whole novel. (MM
75)
On this subject, O'Connor is adamant: "A story is a way to 
say something that can't be said any other way, and it takes 
every word in the story to say what the meaning is. You tell a 
story because a statement would be inadequate" (MM 96). O'Con­
nor cannot make this plain enough; "When you can state the theme 
of a story, when you can separate it from the story itself, then
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you can be sure the story is not a very good one" (96). Again: 
"When anybody asks what a story is about, the only proper thing 
is to tell him to read the story" (96).
For O'Connor to emphasize this point so strongly and in such 
a variety of ways, she was certainly persuaded that every word in 
a well-told story implies a choice, the result of a judgment, 
again, the act characteristic of the artist. Nor should her 
vehemence be surprising: as Maritain had written of artists, "all 
that deviates from the straight line of their object galls them; 
hence their intransigence - what concession could they admit of? 
They are fixed in an absolute" (A&S 12).
2.3 On Art as a Source of Delight
Flannery O'Connor demonstrates her belief that art by its 
nature is a source of delight when she criticizes those who 
understand literature principally as a puzzle, to be dissected in 
each of its specimens: "I think something has gone wrong . . .  
when, for so many . . . the story becomes simply a problem to be 
solved, something which you evaporate to get Instant Enlighten­
ment" (MM 108). In a letter to an unnamed professor of English, 
she writes that the meaning of a story is not subject to capture 
by an interpretation anyway, but, on the contrary, likely to 
expand in the reader's mind, the more he reflects upon it (Th^ 
Habit of Being 437).^ In this same letter, she identifies the 
problem created by English teachers whose manner of dealing with 
fiction is inappropriate to its nature: "If teachers are in the 
habit of approaching a story as if it were a research problem for 
which any answer is believable so long as it is not obvious, then 
I think students will never learn to enjoy fiction" (HB. 437).
O'Connor, however, was certainly not opposed to literary 
analysis, although "too much interpretation is certainly worse 
than too little, and where feeling for a story is absent, theory 
will not supply it" (HE[ 437). For her, in fact, interpretation 
is simply a means to enjoyment: "Proper1y , you analyze to enjoy"
(MM 108). But satisfactory analysis presupposes enjoyment: "to 
analyze with any discrimination, you have to have enjoyed al­
ready" (108).
For O'Connor, fiction writing is an art, and its product 
another material residence of beauty, the sign of whose presence 
is the readers' delight. In language as poetic as it is philo­
sophic, Maritain had described the experience of delight propor­
tioned by the intuition of artistic beauty:
The intelligence, . . . diverted from all effort of 
abstraction, rejoices without work and without dis­
course. It is dispensed from its usual labor; it does 
not have to disengage an intelligible from the matter 
in which it is buried, in order to go over its differ—  
ent attributes step by step; like a stag at the gushing 
spring, intelligence has nothing to do but drink; it 
drinks the clarity of being. (A&S 26)
For O'Connor, he who has not yet experienced in a work of 
fiction the satisfaction of a "stag at [a] gushing spring", is 
not prepared to analyze. Such a reader is comparable to someone 
visually impaired before a masterpiece in a gallery.
2.4 On the Role of the Senses in Art
In A&S. Maritain initially concedes only with a certain 
reluctance the roll of the senses in the perception of beauty, 
art's prime characteristic. First, he says that "beauty is essen­
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tially an object of intelligence, for that which knoiMS in the 
full sense of the word is intelligence, which alone is open to 
the infinity of being" (23). However, before beauty can be thus 
known, from its natural dwelling place in the intelligible world, 
it first "descends. But it also, in a way, falls under the grasp 
of the senses, in so far as in man they serve the intellect and 
can themselves take delight in knowing" (23). Qnly after having 
established beauty's origin does Maritain grant, and surprisingly 
generously, considering his original reluctance, that "the part 
played by the senses in the perception of beauty is even rendered 
enormous in us, and well-nigh indispensable, by the very fact 
that our intelligence is not intuitive, as is the intelligence of 
the angel" (23). Ultimately, in order to distinguish with maxi­
mum clarity the act of intuiting the "brilliance of form" which 
is beauty, from the act of abstracting scientific truth, Maritain 
ringingly declares: "beauty . . . n o  matter how purely intelligi­
ble it may be in itself, is seized in the sensible and through 
the sensible, and not separately from it" (25).
For O'Connor, on the other hand, the role of the senses in 
art is outright fundamental, without apology inseparable from her 
art, from start to finish:
[One] quality of fiction . . .  I think is its least 
common denominator - [is] the fact that it is 
concrete . . . .  [The] nature of fiction is in large 
measure determined by the nature of our perceptive 
apparatus. The beginning of human knowledge is through 
the senses, and the fiction writer begins where human 
perception begins. He appeals through the senses and 
you cannot appeal to the senses with abstractions. (MM 
67)
This principle O'Connor repeatedly presents, approaching it 
from various angles, as if endlessly fascinated by what she 
evidently considers the splendid truth it conveys; "Fiction is 
supposed to represent life, and the fiction writer has to use as 
many aspects of life as are necessary to make his total picture 
convincing. The fiction writer doesn't state, he shows, renders"
(HB 143). According to O'Connor, this is, very simply, the nature 
of the task, determined by the nature of fiction; "If you're 
writing about the vulgar you have to prove they're vulgar by 
showing them at it" (43).
What O'Connor means by "rendering" she demonstrates clearly 
in two sentences (from Flaubert's Madame Bovary). the second of 
which she says "always stops me in admiration";
She struck the notes with aplomb and ran from top to 
bottom of the keyboard without a break. Thus shaken up, 
the old instrument, whose strings buzzed, could be 
heard at the other end of the village when the window 
was open, and often the bailiff's clerk, passing along 
the highroad, bareheaded and in list slippers, stopped 
to listen, his sheet of paper in his hand. ([W 69)
In the previous sentence, according to O'Connor Flaubert has 
created "a believable village to put Emma in. It's always neces­
sary to remember that the fiction writer is much less immediately 
concerned with grand ideas and bristling emotions than he is with 
putting list slippers on clerks" (MM 70).
For the writer, what corresponds to the obligatory and 
constant use of concrete detail in the construction of fictional 
worlds is the necessity of developing the power of observation; 
"learning to see is the basis for learning all the arts except 
music," says O'Connor. "I know a good many fiction writers who 
paint, not because they're any good at painting, but because it
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helps their writing. It forces them to look at things" (jW 93).
For writers, therefore, O'Connor recommends the study of 
"logic, mathematics, theology, and of course and particularly 
drawing. Anything that helps you to see, anything that makes you 
look. The writer should never be ashamed of staring. There is 
nothing that doesn't require his attention" (MM 84), for "the 
first and most obvious characteristic of fiction is that it deals 
with reality through what can be seen, heard, smelt, tasted, and 
touched" (91). It is this reality, rearranged, that will result 
in the fictional world, but the fiction writer must be able first 
to describe the real world accurately, which presupposes having 
perceived it sharply, "in order to have the authority to rear­
range it at all" (98).
In her considerations on the role of the senses in art, it 
is evident that O'Connor follows Maritain only as far as her own 
experience as a writer of fiction allows. Thus, for example, she 
makes no mention of beauty descending "from its natural dwelling 
place in the intelligible world". From wherever beauty does or 
does not descend, O'Connor evidently has perceived such specula­
tion as irrelevant to her task as a writer of fiction.
2.5 On the Relationship between Fiction and Mystery
In spite of the fact that art begins with and is dependent 
fundamentally on the senses, O'Connor perceives the reach of one 
of these means of perception as supplemented in a perhaps unex­
pected way: "[although for] the writer of fiction everything has 
its testing point in the eye", this organ "eventually involves 
the whole personality and as much of the world as can be got into 
it" (MM 144). O'Connor notes further that "Msgr. Guardini has
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written that the roots of the eye are in the heart. In any case, 
for the Catholic they stretch far and away into those depths of 
mystery which the modern world is divided about" (144-45).
Concisely, O'Connor describes what she understands as the 
consequences for the Catholic writer of fiction:
When fiction is made according to its nature, it should 
reinforce our sense of the supernatural by grounding it 
in concrete, observable reality. If the writer uses his 
eyes in the real security of his Faith, he will be 
obliged to use them honestly and his sense of mystery 
and his acceptance of it will be increased. (MU 148) 
For O'Connor, "all novelists are fundamentally seekers and 
describers of the real, but the realism of each novelist will 
depend on his view of the ultimate reaches of reality" (MM 40- 
41). Furthermore, such is her respect for concrete reality that 
she seems to ascribe to mere descriptions of it power to evoke 
that which lies beyond: "a writer may produce a great tragic 
naturalism, for by his responsibi1ity to the things he sees, he 
may transcend the limitations of his narrow vision" (41).
In any case, what is clear from her writings is her unques­
tioning regard for sensible reality as the sole prime matter of 
fiction, regardless of the ultimate point to which it may lead 
the heart-rooted eye;
What the fiction writer will discover, if he discovers, 
anything at all, is that he himself cannot move or mold 
reality in the interests of abstract truth. The writer 
learns, perhaps more quickly than the reader, to be 
humble in the face of what-is. What-is is all he has to 
do with; the concrete is his medium; and he will real­
ize eventually that fiction can transcend its limita­
tions only by staying in them. (MU 145-46)
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This insistence on the precedence of "what-xs", if mystery 
is to become manifest, clearly follows Maritain, for whom the 
form of things, "their operating mystery", their "ontological 
secret" (A&S 24), is "seized in the sensible and through the 
sensible, and not separately from it" (25). For the artist 
O'Connor, as for the philosopher Maritain, no other access to 
mystery exists.
Nor can mystery be disassociated from the activity and 
purpose of the novelist: "the art of the novel . . .  is something 
that one experiences alone and for the purpose of realizing in a 
fresh way, through the senses, the mystery of existence" (HB 
143). Fiction, therefore, "is the concrete expression of mystery" 
(144), but only because "The fiction writer is an observer, 
first, last, and always" (MM 178).
2.6 On the Humility of the Fiction Writer's Task
Flannery O'Connor seems to have been constitutionally inca­
pable of dramatizing either herself or the type of work she did: 
"There has been no interesting or noble struggle. The only thing 
I wrestle with is the language, and a certain poverty of means in 
handling it, but this is merely what you have to do to write at 
all."^ She was equally unfazed by the task confronting fellow 
practitioners of the art: "Fiction writers engage in the homeli­
est, and most concrete, and most unromanticizable of all arts"
(MM 53). And just as the Schoolmen, according to Maritain, had 
attributed the virtue of art, "the intrinsic development of 
reason, the nobility of intellect" not only to Phidias and Praxi­
teles, but to "the village carpenter and blacksmith as well"
(A&S 20), so did O'Connor, reciproca11y , describe fiction writ­
ing as "heavy labor" (1^ 69), echoing Maritain's description of
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the artist's toil with matter as "drudgery" ( 3 4 ) .
For the type of heavy labor that is his lot, the fiction 
writer's sensibility, no matter how fine, or psychological per­
ception, no matter how acute, alone are as insufficient as they 
would be to the work of a carpenter or blacksmith. A writer not 
yet cognizant of this sobering fact "will put down one intensely 
emotional or keenly perceptive sentence after the other, and the 
result will be complete dullness" (MM 68), dull because empty, 
devoid of the stone and mortar with which the fiction writer by
the nature of his art is condemned to work:
The fact is that the materials of the fiction writer 
are the humblest. Fiction is about everything human and 
we are made of dust, and if you scorn getting yourself 
dusty, then you shouldn't try to write fiction. It s 
not a grand enough job for you. ([^ 68)
The fiction writer, made of dust, must express his vision 
through that which is likewise made of dust, for "any abstractly 
expressed compassion or piety or morality in a piece of fiction 
is only a statement added" (MM 75). Where abstraction begins, 
fiction ends and, with it, the suffering: "Writing a novel is a 
terrible experience, during which the hair often falls out and 
the teeth decay" (77), in manifestations analogous to the aching 
back of the blacksmith, and strained muscles of the carpenter.
O'Connor makes clear that if Manicheanistically inclined 
persons are to suffer falling hair and tooth decay, novel writing
will unlikely be the cause:
The Manicheans separated s p i r i t  and matter. To them all 
material things were evil. They sought pure spirit and 
tried to approach the infinite directly without any 
mediation of matter. This is also pretty much the modern
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spirit, and for the sensibility infested with it, 
fiction is hard if not impossible to write because 
fiction is so very much an incarnational art. (1^ 68)
A country lady shows thorough understanding of this princi­
ple when she observes of some of O'Connor's stories, lent to her 
by the writer herself: "Well, them stories just gone and shown 
you how some folks t^ould do" (MM 90). Notes O ’Connor: "I 
thought to myself that that was right; when you write stories, 
you have to be content to start exactly there - showing how some 
specific folks wj'ii do, wiii do in spite of everything" (90).
O'Connor reveres this principle so much that she singles out 
for one of her memorable blasts would-be writers of fiction who 
have not yet perceived its significance:
[Showing how some folks "will do"] is a very humble 
level to have to begin on, and most people who think 
they want to write stories are not willing to start 
there. They want to write about problems, not people; 
or about abstractions, not concrete situations. They 
have an idea, or a feeling, or an overflowing ego, or 
they want to Be A Writer, or they want to give their 
wisdom to the world in a simple—enough way for the 
world to be able to absorb it. In any case, they don't 
have a story and they wouldn't be willing to write it 
if they did; and in the absence of a story, they set 
out to find a theory or a formula or a technique. (MM 
90-91)
Certainly theories, formulas, or techniques, if they were 
compatible with the nature of fiction writing, would lighten the 
burden of novelists, but as matters stand, the load continues 
heavy: "One reason . . . people find it so difficult to write 
stories is that they forget how much time and patience is re­
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quired to convince through the senses" ( 9 1 ) .  Only dust, in 
multitudinous forms constituting that variegated reality accessi­
ble through sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, is capable 
of persuading the reader of fiction. Therefore the fiction writ­
er, like the spider, cannot skip any step in the process of 
weaving his web:
The fiction writer has to realize that he can't create 
compassion with compassion, or emotion with emotion, or 
thought with thought. He has to provide all these 
things with a body; he has to create a world with 
weight and extension. ( 9 2 )
□'Connor notes that Henry James has named the sin of fiction 
writers insufficiently concerned with detail "weak specifi­
cation." Thus, "the eye will glide over their words while the 
attention goes to sleep" ( 9 2 ) .  Analogously, what is it 
reasonable to expect of the work of a carpenter, potter, or 
portrait painter habitually inattentive or indifferent to the 
fine requirements of his craft and the possibilities of his 
materials?
2.7 On the Rules of Art and their Consequences 
for the Fiction Writer
Maritain had compared the rules of art to preexisting paths 
through a tangled thicket, which must be discovered, "ways of 
operation peculiar to art itself, the ways of working reason, 
ways high and hidden" (A&S 38). O'Connor, who cites UJise B1 ood 
as having been written by an author "congenitally innocent of 
theory" (MJM 114), portrays her own procedure when writing fic­
tion as groping through just such a thicket. Declaring herself a
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non-believer in theorizing, O'Connor goes on: "In the end you do 
just what you're able to and don't know what has been done."^
Showing just how uncharted the fiction writing adventure can 
be, O'Connor observes: "If you start with a real personality, a 
real character, then something is bound to happen; and you don't 
have to know what before you begin. In fact it may be better if 
you don't know what before you begin" {MTI 106). This statement 
seems to imply that knowing where one is going in writing fiction 
may not be so hazardous after all. But O'Connor continues: "You 
ought to be able to discover something from your stories. If you 
don't, probably nobody else will" (106).
In an interview, when asked whether she worked on her novels 
from an outline, O'Connor could hardly have provided a more vivid 
answer: "Well, I just kind of feel it out like a hound-dog. I 
follow the scent. Quite frequently it's the wrong scent, and you 
stop and go back to the last plausible point and start in some 
other direction."^ In this same interview, O'Connor at most 
concedes knowing in advance the direction she is going in, "but 
you don't know how you'll get there" (quoted in Magee 19). And, 
certainly, to establish its theme before telling a story is an 
inversion in the order of procedure: "the theme is more or less 
something that's in you, but if you intellectualize too much you  ^
probably destroy your novel" (19). It's necessary to begin with 
the story, because "then you've got something" (19). The corol­
lary, of course, is that without the story, one has nothing.
O'Connor's experience as a fiction writer obviously persuad­
ed her that, in venturing through the thicket, the writer of 
fiction should be the lightest of travelers; "I don't have [Wise 
Blood] outlined and I have to write to discover what I am doing. 
Like the old lady, I don't know so well what I think until I see 
what I say; then I have to say it over again" (KB 5).Graphica1-
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ly she describes the struggles in the thicket, states their aim, 
and what they actually are; "I was five years on UJise Blood and 
seven on [The Violent Bear It Away]. and in that time you turn 
and twist and try it every possible way and only one thing works. 
What you are really twisting about is in your limitations, of 
course" (HB 353).
O'Connor disclaims any other mode of procedure, again de­
claring; "I don't have any theory of literature", but "simply 
keep doing things the wrong way over and over until they suddenly 
come out right. . . . That's one reason why I'm such a slow 
worker."^ O'Connor notes that in the seven years which went into 
the writing of The Violent Bear It Away. other literary projects 
were also undertaken which, however, never resulted in more than 
two short stories yearly.
Prior to setting out to the literary struggle, the creation 
of the "formal piece", O'Connor does, however, admit to requiring 
a certain minimum; "I have to have a 'story' in mind - some 
incident or observation that excites me and in which I can see 
fictional possibilities" (qtd. in Conner 47). An example of 
what O'Connor means is in her account of the origins of her short 
story "Good Country People";
When I started writing that story, I didn't know there 
was going to be a Ph.D. with a wooden leg in it. I 
merely found myself one morning writing a description 
of two women that I knew something about, and before I 
realized it, I had equipped one of them with a daughter 
with a wooden leg. As the story progressed, I brought 
in the Bible salesman, but I had no idea what I was 
going to do with him. I didn't know he was going to 
steal that wooden leg until ten or twelve lines before
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he did it, but when I found out that this was what was 
going to happen, I realized that it was inevitable.
(MM 100)
Thus "Good Country People" sprang from a description of two 
women, known somewhat. Fully bloomed, it had required almost no 
rewriting: "It is a story that was under control throughout the 
writing" (MM 100), a control that O'Connor describes as not 
entirely conscious, just as, according to Maritain, the rules of 
art themselves are hidden and obscure (and, therefore, mysteri­
ous ) .
Arranging her modest working material —  the incident or 
observation with fictional possibilities— does not dispense 
O'Connor from what corresponds for writers to the daily gymnas­
tics practiced by an athlete: "I do try to write at least three 
hours every morning, since discipline is so important" (qtd. in 
Donner 47). In fact, according to O'Connor, these are the only 
preparations possible, prior to the struggle in the thicket 
itself, where technique can only be described, at least in the 
best stories, as "something organic that grows out of the materi­
al and . . .  is different for every story of any account that has 
ever been written" (MT1 67), "not something you learn and apply 
to what you have to do; it is a way of making something."® Ap­
proaching the same subject from a different angle, she says: "The 
only way, I think, to learn to write [fiction] is to write [it], 
and then to discover what you have done. The time to think of 
technique is when you've actually got the [work] in front of you" 
(MM 102).
Describing the writing of her second novel, she reflects on 
how the active participation of the Divine might affect the 
process and reaches a characteristically earthy conclusion:
Stories get to be written in different ways, of course,
65
but The Violent Bear It Away was discovered in the 
process of finding out what I was able to make live. 
Even if one were filled with the Holy Ghost, the Holy 
Ghost would work through the given talent. Even if [He] 
dictated a novel, I doubt very much that all would be 
flow . . . [or] that the writer would be relieved of 
his capacity for taking pains (which is all technique 
is in the end); I doubt that he would lose the habit of 
art. (HB 387)
But, paradoxically, the ultimate results of the habit of 
art, i.e., the exercise of the will and the capacity to take 
pains of- a certain sort, are by no means rationally predictable 
at every step in the process. On the contrary, they are bound to 
be a revelation; "If a writer is any good, what he makes will 
have its source in a realm much larger than that which his con­
scious mind can encompass and will always be a greater surprise 
to him than it can ever be to his reader" ([W 83). A concrete 
example of what O'Connor means follows;
From my own experience in trying to make stories 
"work," I have discovered that what is needed is an 
action that is totally unexpected, yet totally believa­
ble, and I have found that, for me, this is always an 
action which indicates that grace has been offered. And 
frequently it is an action in which the devil has been 
the unwilling instrument of grace. This is not a piece 
of knowledge that I consciously put into my stories; it 
is a discovery I get out of them. (MTI 118)
Finally, the experienced O'Connor confesses the strict 
limits within which she feels capable of saying something about 
her art:
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I have very little to say about [fiction] writing. It's 
one thing to write [fiction] and another thing to talk 
about writing [it], and I hope you realize that . . . 
asking me to talk about [fiction writing] is just like 
asking a fish to lecture on swimming. The more [fic­
tion] I write, the more mysterious I find the process 
and the less I find myself capable of analyzing it. 
Before I started writing [fiction], I suppose I could 
have given you a pretty good lecture on the subject, 
but nothing produces silence like experience, and at 
this point I have very little to say about how [fiction 
is] written. (MM 87)
The little O'Connor does have to say speaks for the hidden 
nature of the process, which mirrors the hidden nature of what, 
for Maritain, are the rules to which the process corresponds. 
Furthermore, these rules of difficult access must be sought and 
sought again. Like fingerprints, they do not repeat themselves 
but rather are "determined according to the contingency of singu­
lar cases . . .  in an always new and unforeseeable manner" (ft&5 
47-48). Only the next work of art will reveal, at least in ef­
fect, what the latest ones have been. The fiction writer will 
have found them in the only way he can: by taking pains.
2.8 On Art as a Gift
Flannery O'Connor understood as the "peculiar burden of the 
fiction writer [the fact] that he has to make one country do for 
all and that he has to evoke [it] through the concrete particu­
lars of a life that he can make believable" (MM 27). But the. 
ability to do this she regards as a vocation, i.e., "a limiting 
factor which extends even to the kind of material that the writer
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is able to apprehend imaginative!y" (27). Thus, the writer is 
not free to make live the object of his choice,, but only that 
which falls within the capacity of his imagination's intuitive 
understanding. That within these limits he can confer life con­
stitutes both vocation and gift.
According to O'Connor, "The Christian writer particularly 
will feel that whatever his initial gift is, it comes from God" 
(MM 27) and "is a mystery in itself, something gratuitous"
(81). Thus, the capacity to confer life imaginatively precedes 
any and all effort and education, "there [being] no excuse for 
anyone to write fiction for public consumption unless he has been 
called to do so by the presence of a gift" (81). Absolutely 
nothing can make up for its lack: "no amount of sensitivity can 
make a story-writer out of you if you just plain don't have a 
gift for telling a story" (77). Or then: "the ability to create 
life with words is essentially a gift. If you have it in the 
first place, you can develop it; if you don't have it, you might 
as well forget it" (88).
The following anecdote shows O'Connor at her most matter-of- 
fact in addressing this subject:
[While talking to a group of students] one of the 
(them) asked me, "Miss O'Connor, why do you write?" and 
I said, "Because I'm good at it," and at once I felt a 
considerable disapproval in the atmosphere. I felt that 
this was not thought by the majority to be a high- 
minded answer; but it was the only answer I could give. 
I had not been asked why I write the way I do, but why 
I write at all; and to that question there is only one 
legitimate answer. (MM. 81)
As for the peculiar nature of her fiction, O'Connor ex­
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plained it in an equally homely manner; "a graduate student . . . 
wants to know why my stories are grotesque; are they grotesque 
because I am showing the frustration of grace? It's very hard to 
tell these innocents that they are grotesque because that is the 
nature of my talent" (HB. 328).
□'Connor writes that the novelist, if he is "to portray 
reality as it manifests itself in our concrete, sensual life," 
besides having "been given the initial instrument, the talent"
(MM 170), must ceaselessly cultivate it;
no matter how long [the novelist] has written or how 
good he is - [he is always involved in] the endless 
process of learning how to write. As soon as the writer 
"learns to write," as soon as he knows what he is going 
to find, and discovers a way to say what he knew all 
along, or worse still, a way to say nothing, he is 
finished. (MM 83)
On the other hand, since "possibility and limitation mean 
about the same thing" (MT1 170) the fiction writer, although 
called to develop to its highest possibilities his gift, cannot 
exceed its limits. Thus, in utilizing the novel as their form, 
"Hemingway had to test his manhood . . . and V. Woolf had to make 
it a laboratory, and A. Huxley a place to give lectures in. Given 
themselves I don't suppose any of them could have written any 
other way" (HB 451).
But, according to O'Connor, neither would attempting to 
exceed the real limits of their gifts have served any good pur­
pose, since "the novel [can only be] a product of our best -limi­
tations. We write with the whole personality, and any attempt to 
circumvent it, whether this be an effort to rise above belief or 
above background, is going to result in a reduced approach to 
reality" (MT1 193). Thus, the good of the artist's work requires
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that the natural gift be both exercised in the plenitude of its 
reality and respected in the reality of its limits.
For his part, Maritain had written; "[a] natural gift 
is . . .  a pre-requisite of art, or again a rough outline . . . 
of the artistic habitus” (A&S 41). Aquinas, before him, had 
ascribed the disposition, the prevailing tendencies natural to 
each individual and distinguishing one from the other, to the
O
physical makeup peculiar to each. Rooted in that, says Maritain, 
is the imagination, the principle provisioner of art, the
gift par excellence by which the artist is born - and 
which the poets gladly make their main facu1ty, because 
it is so intimately bound up with the activity of the 
creative intellect that it is difficult in the concrete 
to distinguish the one from the other. (41)
On this point, as seen above, O'Connor in her terse language 
obviously agreed.
2.9 On the Necessity of Knowing the Tradition
Although for Maritain apprenticeship is the type of educa­
tion eminently proper to art as a virtue of the practical intel­
lect, the fact remained that "for the immense amount of rational 
and discursive work that art involves, the tradition of a disci­
pline and an education by the masters . . .  is absolutely neces­
sary" (43). O'Connor manifests a similar point of view, first, 
by denying the legitimacy of including in the study of literature 
incursions into either the psychology of the author, or the 
sociology of his work; "a work of art exists without its author 
from the moment the words are on paper, and the more complete the 
work, the less important it is who wrote it or why" (Wl 126).
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As an example of the shape that grounding in the tradition 
might take for a writer of fiction, the experience of O'Connor 
herself is recorded in a letter to "A.": "The only good things I 
read as [a fledgling] . . . were the Greek and Roman myths which 
I got out of a set of child's encyclopedia called The Book of 
Know ledge" (HB 98). Later on in her early years, O'Connor went 
through a period when her reading "consisted chiefly in a volume 
called The Humerous (sic) Tales of E . A . Poe" (98).
In the same letter, O'Connor writes that her serious read- : 
ing began at the same time she began writing in graduate school: 
"when I went to Iowa I had never heard of Faulkner, Kafka, Joyce, 
much less read them. Then I began to read everything at once"
(HB 98). Considering the extremely lean literary diet upon which 
O'Connor had theretofore subsisted, the list of authors which she 
then read is impressive: among the Catholics, first mentioned, 
are Bernanos, Bloy, Greene, Mauriac, and Waugh. She read "all the 
nuts like . . . Va. Woolf (unfair to the dear lady of course)," 
as well as "the best Southern writers like Faulkner and the 
Tates, K.A. Porter, [and] Eudora Welty" (98). There were the 
Russians: "not Tolstoy so much but Dostoevsky, Turgenev, Chekhov 
and Gogol" (98-99). She "totally skipped such people as Dreiser, 
Anderson (except for a few stories) and Thomas Wolfe" (99), but 
declares she "learned something from Hawthorne, Flaubert, Balzac 
and . . . Kafka, though I have never been able to finish one of 
his novels" (99). As for Henry James, she read almost all of his 
work, although "from a sense of High Duty and because when I read 
[him] I feel something is happening to me, in slow motion but 
happening nevertheless" (99). She admired "Dr. Johnson's Lives 
of the Poets". But always the largest thing that looms up is The 
Humerous Tales of Edgar A1Ian Poe" (99) .
None among those whose work she read, however, does O'Connor
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single out as being the major influence on her own work, for she 
had begun "to read everything at once, so much so that I [suppose 
I] didn't have time . . .  to be influenced by any one writer"
(HB 98). She had begun rather late her broad and intense explo­
rations as a reader, yet interspersed as they were with writing, 
O'Connor underwent a highly concentrated apprenticeship, of the 
type described by Maritain as indispensable to the development of 
the artist.
In her own considerations about the necessity of knowing 
the tradition, O'Connor of course speaks as a writer of fiction. 
Concerned with the literary education of young readers in general 
(among these are the future writers), she recommends that the 
school system supply "a guided opportunity, through the best 
writing of the past, to come, in time, to an understanding of the 
best writing of the present" (MM 140). For her, fiction, "if it 
is going to be taught in high schools, should be taught as a sub­
ject, and a subject with a history" (138). She understood that 
"the effect of a novel depends not only on its innate impact, but 
upon the ex per ien ce, literary and otherwise, with which it is 
approached" (138). Without such experience, the student, im­
mersed thoroughly in the realities of his own time, "has no 
perspective whatever from which to view [other ones]" (138). As 
for the possibility of, in providing him with a broader perspec­
tive, coming into conflict with the student's taste, it disturbs 
O'Connor not at all: "His taste should not be consu1 ted [anyway]; 
it is being formed" (140).
2.10 On the First Duty of the Artist
Maritain had written in a variety of ways that the artist's
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first duty is to the good of his work. First, he hearkened back 
to the Schoolmen's distinction between Making and Doing, the 
former defined as "productive action, considered not with regard 
to the use which we therein make of our freedom, but merely with 
regard to the thing produced or with regard to the work taken in 
itself" (A&S 8). But when working with regard for the thing 
produced, ad bonum operis, "productive action" is synonymous with 
art. (In contrast, "all that turns [art] from this end perverts 
it and diminishes it" (15).)
However, to labor towards the good of anything is to love 
it. Therefore the artist's work constitutes an act of love: "the 
artist has to love, he has to love what he is making . . .  so 
that his work may come forth from his heart and his bowels as 
well as from his lucid spirit" (A&S 47).
O'Connor, in prose of another flavor, demonstrates a like 
conviction: "No art is sunk in the self, but rather, in art the 
self becomes self-forgetful in order to meet the demands of the 
thing seen and the thing being made" (MTI 82). In addressing a 
group of writing students, she speculates about their motiva­
tions: "To make money or to express your soul or to insure civil 
rights or to irritate your grandmother" (66), in contrast with 
her own: "[to bring about] the good of the written work" (66). 
Some of her most mordant criticism is reserved for writers with . 
(from her point of view) lesser motivations: "I think it is 
usually some form of self-inflation that destroys the free use of 
[the writer's] gift.’*‘ This may be the pride of the reformer or 
the theorist, or it may only be that simple-minded se1f-apprecia-
)K The writer is free to do whatever he chooses, but only as this 
is ordered to the good of his work. Similarly, "freedom is of no 
use without taste and without the ordinary competence to follow 
the particular laws of what we have been given to do" (MM 153).
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tion which uses its own sincerity as a standard of truth" (82).
She effusively scorns writers who, having cast off the 
burden of reason's demands (and "St. Thomas [had] called art 
'reason in making'" (MM 82)), fill the vacuum entirely with 
feelings' flux, whatever the form it may take;
If you have read the very vocal writers from San Fran­
cisco, you may have got the impression that the first 
thing you must do in order to be an artist is to loose 
yourself from the bonds of reason, and thereafter 
anything that rolls off the top of your head will be of 
great value. Anyone's unrestrained feelings are consid­
ered worth listening to because they are feelings. (MM 
82)
But art is first habitus, consistent acts of judgment, from 
which the ego's noisy demands must be excluded:
Maritain says that to produce a work of art requires 
the constant attention of the purified mind, and the 
business of the purified mind in this case is to see 
that those elements of the personality that don't bear 
on the subject at hand are excluded. Stories don't lie 
when left to themselves. Everything has to be subordi­
nated to the whole which is not you. Any story I reveal 
myself completely in will be a bad story. ( 1 0 5 )
Thus, a major obstacle to becoming a decent writer of fic­
tion stands in the way of "a good many shiftless people" attract­
ed to the activity but "burdened with poetic feelings or afflict­
ed by sensibility" (MT1 85), for art requires none of these. 
Rather, according to Aquinas, it "is wholly concerned with the 
good of that which is made" (171). And when, says O'Connor,
the writer's attention is on producing a work of art, a
work that is good in itself, he is going to take great 
pains to control every excess, everything that does not 
contribute to this central meaning and design. He 
cannot indulge in sentimentality, in propagandizing, or 
in pornography and create a work of art, for all these 
things are excesses. They call attention to themselves 
and distract from the work as a whole. ( m  187-88) 
Fervent Catholic that she was, O'Connor sees the discipline 
implied by the practice of the art of fiction as, at the minimum, 
a safeguard against forays of the devil: "tthe] best defense 
against his taking over [prospective writers'] work will lie in 
their strict attention to the order, proportion and radiance of 
what they are making" (189). (Recall that order, proportion and 
radiance are beauty's three characteristics (A&5 24).) Indeed, 
fiction, made according to its own laws is an antidote 
to [the tendency to compartmenta1ize the spiritual and 
make it resident in a certain type of life only], for 
it renews our knowledge that we live in a mystery from 
which we draw our abstractions. The Catholic fiction 
writer, as fiction writer, will look for the will of 
God first in the laws and limitations of his art, (MM 
151-152)
Thus, the artist's first duty, which is to the good of his 
work, when fulfilled results not only in art, but for O'Connor 
also conduces to a dimming of the line dividing the spiritual and 
material realms. In greater possibilities for perceiving both the 
divine will and the unity of creation, dedication to her art and 
fidelity to the duty it imposed seems to have yielded O'Connor 
something of the dividend suggested in ft&S: "[the artist] in a 
way , , .- is not of this world, being, from the moment that he 
works for beauty, on the path which leads upright souls to God
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2.11 On Form and Literary Art
Form had been defined by Aquinas as that principle consti­
tuting the "proper perfection of all that is . . . in their 
essences and qualities" (A&S 24), a definition elaborated 
further by Maritain, who calls form "the ontological secret" 
borne within things, the "spiritual being, [the] operating mys­
tery" and, above all, "the proper principle of intelligibility, 
the clarity of every thing" (24-25). Incarnate, form resides in, 
and is inseparable from, intelligibly arranged matter.
An example of literary work lacking form, in O'Connor's 
view, are the first eighty pages of Boris Pasternak's Doctor 
Zhivago;
There were a lot of wonderful things in [them] but I 
don't think I could have stood that much formlessness 
for however many hundred pages there were. A friend of 
mine reviewed it and said it was like a huge shipwreck 
with a lot of beautiful things floating in it. You are 
not supposed to feel at home or at ease in any of the 
forms you see around you. Create your own form out of 
what you've got, let it take care of itself. (HB 349)
At the other extreme, neither is art imitation, ref 1ecting 
"with fidelity . . . the way things look and happen in normal 
life" ( m  39), within the context of existing social, economic, 
or psychological forces. (As Maritain had written: "Imitation 
is . . . precisely what art is not" (A&S 53).)
But if it is true that "all novelists are fundamenta11y 
seekers and describers of the real" (MTI 40), it is also true
and manifests to them the invisible things by the visible" (37).
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that reality is perceived and interpreted by individual subject­
ivities: "What one sees is given by circumstances and by the 
nature of one's particular kind of perception" (179). Further­
more, "the realism of each novelist will depend on his view of 
the ultimate reaches of reality" (40-41). At any rate, to wher—  
ever it may extend or whatever it may include, in communicating 
his particular vision, the fiction writer, by O'Connor's lights, 
is as free to be exactly as orthodox or innovative as his work 
demands, so long as it has vitality, "presents something that is 
alive, however eccentric its life may seem to the general reader" 
(39).
To illustrate concretely what she understands by vitality, 
O'Connor singles out that which for her is captured in children's 
drawings: "When a child draws, he doesn't intend to distort but 
to set down exactly what he sees, and as his gaze is direct, he 
sees the lines that create motion" which, for the writer, are 
usually "invisible . . . lines of spiritual motion" (Wl 113). 
Such lines result from art's truthfulness: "the truthfulness of 
the essential that creates movement" (70), movement created when 
the storyteller "renders his vision" (162), i.e., "what he sees 
and not what he thinks he ought to see" (131). Such work re­
quires an intrusion "on the timeless, and that is only done by 
the violence of a single-minded respect for the truth" (83). But 
this attitude and procedure for O'Connor is simply the artist's 
way of being reasonable, enabling him "to find, in the object, in 
the situation, in the sequence, the spirit which makes it itself"
(82), in other words, the form, which may or may not require for 
its successful transmission the instrumentation of distortion and 
exaggeration (162). (For Maritain, the integrity and proportion 
of art can be understood "solely in relation to the end of the 
work, which is to make a form shine on matter" (A&S 28).)
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This form, however, cannot be imposed, "as if [it] were 
something that existed outside of each story" (MM 101); rather, 
it grows organically out of the material. Therefore, if the story 
is good, it cannot be reduced, so integrally bound up is it with 
its matter:
In the act of writing, one sees that the way a thing is 
made controls and is inseparable from the whole meaning 
of it. The form of a story, determined step by step 
through the exercise of reason in art's characteristic 
act, gives it meaning which any other form would 
change. (129)
But meaning, for D'Connor, ultimately exceeds whatever the 
form in which it begins, just as mystery overflows from reality. 
Thus, "the fiction writer presents mystery through manners, grace 
through nature, but when he finishes there always has to be left 
over that sense of Mystery which cannot be accounted for by any 
human formula" (MM 153). Nevertheless, each instance of mean­
ing's disemboguing into mystery begins with meaning interwoven 
into, coming into existence simultaneously with, a specific form, 
that which is exactly the "proper perfection of all that is . . . 
in their essences and qualities" (A&S 24), or, in more familiar 
language, that which makes things what they are, wherever it is 
found, fiction included.
2.12 On Art and the Identity of Vision and Moral Judgment
For Maritain, the nature of art determines what morality is 
for the artist qua artist:
The sole question for the artist is not to be a weak­
ling; it is to have an art which is robust enough and
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undeviating enough to dominate at all events his matter 
without losing anything of its loftiness and purity, 
and to aim, in the very act of making, at the sole good 
of the work, without being turned aside or distracted 
by the human ends pursued. (A&S 73)
But if the artist's sole concern is the good of his work, 
the moral values reflected in it cannot have been, in a separate 
act, appended. Rather, since at least "in the greatest fiction, 
the writer's moral sense coincides with his dramatic sense, . . . 
moral judgment [can only be] part of the very act of seeing" (flh 
31), i.e., perceiving whatever it is that in the course of his 
work the writer will render.
O'Connor admits the complexity of the moral basis of fiction 
as a concept and confesses: "I don't doubt that I contradict my­
self on it, for I have no foolproof aesthetic theory . . . [how­
ever] I continue to think that art . . . [has] a moral basis"
(HB 123). This moral basis O'Connor identifies with "James' felt 
life, and not with any particular moral system" (124). The power
to perceive it, O'Connor, however, attributes to belief, and
)ktherefore values : "Your beliefs will be the light by which you 
see [although] they will not be a substitute for seeing" (MM 
91). Inversely, "for the fiction writer, tp believe nothing is to 
see nothing" (HB 147).
On the other hand, O'Connor denies that she writes to convey 
a message, since "this is not the purpose of the novelist . . . . 
Rather, the message I find in the life I see is a moral message"
* "All our values depend on the nature of our God" (Maritain 
75). The divine Christ, for example, is symbolized by a lamb, or 
a cross, which in turn symbolize qualities prized by Christians: 
docility, trusting submission to the designs of Providence, 
patience in suffering, etc. A god of war would obviously repre­
sent other values and be symbolized accordingly.
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(147). Thus, just as the moral basis revealed in the light of 
belief and inseparable from observed life precedes fictional 
rendering, so also must "a piece of fiction . . .  be very much a 
self-contained dramatic unit" (MM 75), "[carrying] its meaning 
inside it . . . [whereas] any abstractly expressed compassion or 
piety or morality in a piece of fiction is only a statement 
added" (75). For O'Connor,
you can't make an inadequate dramatic action complete 
by putting a statement of meaning on the end of it or 
in the middle of it or at the beginning of it. It means 
that when [writing fiction] you are speaking wit/7 
character and action, not about character and action. 
The writer's moral sense must coincide with his dramat­
ic sense. (75-76)
When Maritain described the artist's attempt to separate 
himself from his belief "absurd," he was. writing of the Christian 
artist in particular, whose work is wholly derived from both 
belief and soul, of which he also wrote: "they are one" (A&S 
66). O'Connor, for her part, in addition to extending Maritain's 
observation to fiction writers generically, emphasizes that for 
the writing of fiction religious fervor alone will not suffice: 
"Poorly written novels - no matter how pious and edifying the 
behavior -of the characters — are not good in themselves and are 
therefore not really edifying" (MM_ 174). In these cases, the 
main work has not been done: "The novelist is required to create 
the illusion of a whole world with believable people in it", but 
a world in which "half or three-fourths of the facts of human 
existence" (175) are left out is not true, no matter which emi­
nence may have created it. Such a work may manifest belief, but 
as the dramatic sense in which this is embedded is deficient, the
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work itself testifies to its author's having "committed a grave 
inconsistency, for he is trying to reflect God with what amounts 
to a practical untruth" (174).
Another guarantee of division between the dramatic and the 
moral sense is created when the writer of fiction fails to make 
himself impervious to the. modern reader's need for the "redemp­
tive act, [the demand] that what falls at least be offered the 
right to be restored" (W1 48), but at bargain rates. Although, 
according to O'Connor, "the reader of today looks for this mo­
tion, and rightly so, . . .  he has forgotten the cost of it", 
either because his "sense of evil is diluted or lacking altogeth­
er" (48). In reading a novel, "he wants either his senses tor­
mented or his spirits raised. He wants to be transported instant­
ly, either to mock damnation or a mock innocence" (48-49). But 
the fiction writer cannot labor solely for the good of his work, 
while keeping one eye on opportunities for satisfying such read­
ers.
An example of artistic unity, threats to which O'Connor here 
specifies, was presented by Maritain when he described the atti­
tude of the cathedral builders of the Middle Ages:
The cathedral builders did not harbor any sort of 
thesis. . . .  They neither wished to demonstrate the 
propriety of Christian dogma nor to suggest by some 
artifice a Christian emotion. They even thought a great 
deal less of making a beautiful work than of doing good 
work. They were men of Faith, and as they were, so they 
worked. Their work revealed the truth of God, but 
without doing it intentionally, and because of not 
doing it intentionally. (A&S 63)
When O'Connor insists on the necessity of unity in the 
fiction writer's moral and dramatic sense;, she implies in liter—
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ary terms the necessity for the same characteristics attributed 
by Maritain to the medieval cathedral builders: good workers, at 
one with their beliefs.
2.13 On Art and Propaganda
The literary artist's requisite unity of moral and dramatic 
sense for O'Connor renders art and propaganda, as products of a 
writer's labor, mutually exclusive. While she agrees that Catho­
lic writers may be (as she concedes Catholics generally suppose) 
"out to use fiction to prove the truth of Faith, or at the least, 
to prove the existence of the supernatura1", she declines to 
impute such motives to any given writer, "except as they suggest 
themselves in his finished work" ( MJM 145). However, "when . . . 
finished work suggests that pertinent actions have been fraudu­
lently manipulated or overlooked or smothered, whatever purposes 
the writer started out with have already been defeated" (145). 
For the fact is that the fiction writer "cannot move or mold 
reality in the interests of abstract truth" (145). On the con­
trary , "he learns, perhaps more quickly than the reader, to be 
humble in the face of what-is. What-is is all he has to do with; 
the concrete is his medium; and he will realize eventually that 
fiction can transcend its limitations only by staying in them"
(MM 146). Nothing, the urge to proselytize included, justifies 
exceeding them.
For O'Connor, the writer who is Catholic and by that very
Afact already viewed with suspicion by many non-believers and
* As an example of this attitude, O'Connor presents, from an 
unspecified source, the following statement of writer Philip
£s2
believers of other persuasions, as well as potentially oppressed 
by the unjustifiable expectations of large numbers of his fellows 
in faith, "will be more than ever concerned to have his work 
stand on its own feet and be complete and self-sufficient and 
impregnable in its own right" (Mjl 146). But, again, such work 
demands that the moral sense be attached both to the dramatic 
sense and the "vision of what-is", and that none of this be 
separated from faith. Propaganda may result from such splits; 
artful fiction, which results only from the work of a "whole 
personality" ( 1 5 6 ) ,  cannot.
The making of great fiction for O'Connor requires the in­
volvement of the "whole range of human judgment; it is not simply 
an imitation of feeling" (MM 156) but an arduous hunt, which 
must totally involve the writer, writing "neither for everybody, 
nor for the special few, but for the good of what he is writing", 
and who "looks on fiction as an art and . . . has resigned him­
self to its demands and inconveniences" (171). This hunt, 
rather than being for prospective converts to a given religion or 
ideology, has as its sole objective "a symbol for feeling . . . 
and a way of lodging it which tells the intelligent reader wheth­
er this feeling is adequate or inadequate, whether it is moral 
or immoral, whether it is good or evil" (156).
For O'Connor, both reality in itself and as re-presented in 
great fiction seems to be adequate enough testimony, propaganda 
sufficient for the existence of that which is unseen, to enable 
her to accept, together with Aquinas, "the work of art [as] a 
good in itself" ( 1 7 1 ) .  She observes that Catholic novelists, 
...Continued...
Wylie: "a Catholic, if he is devout, i.e., sold on the authority 
of the Church, is also brain-washed, whether he realizes it or 
not" (MM 144). From such an individual, first rate artistic 
creation could certainly not be expected.
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because they have forgotten this truth, are not content "to stay 
within [their] limitations and make something that is simply a 
good in and by itself", but yearn to fabricate something "utili­
tarian" (171). Satisfying such a yearning O'Connor perceives as 
a defect, not only artistic but also of faith. For if one truly 
believes that "what is good in itself glorifies God because it 
reflects God", one should feel perfectly free to do his duty and 
attend to his art, to "safely leave evangelizing to the evangel­
ists" (171), instead of "distorting [one's] talents in the name 
of God for reasons [judged] good - to reform or to teach or to 
lead people to the Church" (174).
Thus, for O'Connor, J. F. Powers, a born Catholic, is an 
example of a fine writer, despite writing about Catholics who are 
"vulgar, ignorant, greedy, and fearfully drab", characteristics 
which O'Connor admits "have an unmistakable Catholic social 
flavor" (MM 173). Far from wanting to embarrass the Church, 
Powers writes about such people "because, by the grace of God, he 
can't write about any other kind". And again she reminds us: "A 
writer writes about what he is able to make believable" (173), 
and if this is not always very pleasant, the writer has no busi­
ness trying to "tidy up reality" anyway (177). To presume to do 
so, for O'Connor, is "certainly to succumb to the sin of pride" 
(178).
But should he want to show the supernatural in action, for 
O'Connor, again, the only way the writer can do it is "on the 
literal level of natural events, and . . . if he doesn't make 
these natural things believable in themselves, he can’t make them 
believable in any of their spiritual extensions" (m  176). 
O'Connor, in this connection, cites St. Gregory, who "wrote that 
every time the sacred text describes a fact, it reveals a mys-
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tery" and it is this, she continues, that "the fiction writer on 
his lesser level hopes to do" (184). However, the danger exists 
for the writer who is spurred by the religious view of 
the world . . . that he will consider this to be two 
operations instead of one. He will try to enshrine the 
mystery without the fact, and there will follow a 
further set of separations which are inimical to art. 
Judgment will be separated from vision, nature from 
grace, and reason from imagination. ( 1 8 4 )
As for the consequence of being a Catholic for the writer of 
fiction, O'Connor regards it as a unique liberation:
Those who have no absolute values cannot let the rela­
tive remain merely relative; they are always raising it 
to the level of the absolute. The Catholic fiction 
writer is entirely free to observe. He feels no call to 
take on the duties of God or to create a new universe. 
He feels perfectly free to look at the one we already 
have and to show exactly what he sees. He feels no need 
to apologize for the ways of God to man or to avoid 
looking at the ways of man to God. ([^ 178)
As has been seen, Maritain, in writing about the undivided 
purpose of the cathedral builders of the middle ages, had ob­
served that they harbored no theses. For him, their only purpose 
was to do good work, but since they were "men of Faith, so they 
worked. Their work revealed the truth of God, but without doing 
it intentionally, and because of not doing it intentionally"
(A&S 63). For Maritain, any constriction of the intellect which 
impedes the artist from working sing 1e-minded1y for the good of 
his work constitutes a threat to art, a threat which is mortal 
when it proceeds from a "metaphysical and religious cult of the 
nation which would seek to enslave the intellect to the physiolo—
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sgy of a race or to the interests of a State" (75). But 
religion can bind intellect just as effectively, and Maritain 
seems to have admired the cathedral builders precisely because, 
for him, this had not been their case. On the contrary, their 
intellects were entirely absorbed in accomplishing as best they 
could their work, for its own sake, and certainly it must have 
been from contemplating the medieval cathedrals that Maritain 
reached the conclusion multiply echoed in O'Connors writings;
"If you want to make a Christian work, then be Christian, and 
imply try to make a beautiful work, into which your heart will 
pass; do not try to 'make Christian'" (66).
2.14 On Art's Human Roots
Although art, like civilization, philosophy, and science, 
is universal, transcending as does the spirit, "every frontier of 
space or time, every historical or national boundary", Maritain 
affirms that "it does not reside in an angelic mind . . . [but] 
in a soul which animates a living body" (A&S 74). If, there­
fore, the artist is dependent for his learning and progress on 
the existence and support of the society of which he is a part, 
so is his art unthinkable without "everything which the human 
community, spiritual tradition and history transmit to the body 
and mind of man". Consequently, "by its human subject and its 
human roots, art belongs to a time and country". Furthermore, the 
clearer the mark of its country, the more universal and greater 
the work (74). About the fundamental importance of this rela­
tionship Maritain manifested no doubt: "attachment to the natural 
environment, political and territorial, of a nation is.one of the 
conditions of the proper life and therefore of the very univer-
86
sality of the intellect and art" (75).
On this same point, Flannery O'Connor writes, for example, 
that if, on one hand, "to call yourself a Georgia writer is 
certainly to declare a limitation," on the other it is a limita­
tion which, like all [others], is a gateway to reality" (MM 
54). Then, too, for the writer "perhaps the greatest 
blessing . . . [is] to find at home what others have to go else­
where seeking," and O'Connor offers the examples of Faulkner ("at 
home in Oxford") and Eudora Welty ("'locally underfoot,' as she 
puts it, in Jackson" (54)) as two of the many, including her­
self, who are "part of what [they] write about and . . . recog­
nized as such" (56), as well as "sustained in [their] writing by 
the local and the particular and the familiar" (54). It is from 
within the community, in all of its peculiarities, that is drawn 
the "true audience, the audience [by which each writer] checks 
himself" (54), and from which are likely to appear at least "two 
or three of an honest and unpretentious bent", whose favorable 
opinion, as denizens of the same reality, is worth more (at least 
it was to Faulkner) than that of "all the critics in New York 
City" (55).
In his community, the writer shares a common past, "a sense 
of likeness", and finds the "possibility of reading a small 
history in a universal light" (MU 58). For O'Connor, this is 
particularly true in the South, which has "gone into the modern 
world with an inburnt knowledge of human limitations and a sense 
of mystery which could not have developed in our first state of 
innocence - as it has not sufficiently developed in the rest of 
the country". The particu1arity of the writer's knowledge, be­
queathed to him in its wealth and poverty by membership in his 
community, supplies the raw material, on which he draws in order
87
to write, and it is from this, with both the possibilities and 
limitations that it implies, that he will find the material of 
enduring writing (MM 59).
O'Connor observes that many a young writer feels himself 
stymied by his cultural inheritance, and obliged, if he is to 
succeed, "to shake off the clutches of [his] region", situating 
his stories "in [one] whose way of life seems nearer the spirit 
of what [he thinks he has] to say" (Mfl 198). She affirms that 
"[such writers] would like to eliminate the region altogether and 
approach the infinite directly. But this," she concludes, "is notr 
even a possibility" (198).
For O'Connor, when a writer is cut off "from the sights and 
sounds that [develop] a life of their own in [the] senses" (MM 
198), writing, for lack of raw material, withers. Of course, 
today there are those who, although bereft of a community within 
which to cultivate over time common tastes and interests, write 
anyway. But for O'Connor, this is only because the alienation 
that was once a diagnosis "has become an ideal", materializing in 
rootless heroes belonging nowhere. Of such writers, O'Connor 
observes, "The borders of [their] countries are the sides of 
[their skulls]" (200), enclosing too insignificant a territory, 
however rich, since for fiction "the social is superior to the 
purely personal. Somewhere is better than anywhere. And tradi­
tional manners, however unbalanced, are better than no manners at 
all" (200).
In addition to whatever else the writer's social legacy may 
provide, O'Connor cites as indispensable to story-making "stories 
in our background", mythically dimensioned stories common to the 
entire community, which "affect our image and our judgment of 
ourselves". Again, her emphasis is on the necessity of the con­
crete: "Abstractions, formulas, laws will not serve here" (MM
' . 38
Another element of the social inheritance indispensable in 
the writing of fiction is knowledge of a particular idiom: "An 
idiom characterizes a society, and when you ignore the idiom, you 
are very likely ignoring the whole social fabric that could make 
a meaningful character" (MM 90). For of characters apart from 
their society, according to O'Connor little can be said: "You 
can't say anything meaningful about the mystery of a personality 
unless you put that personality in a believable and significant 
context. And the best way to do this is through the character's 
own language" (90).
O'Connor, in her own fiction, provides an example of imple­
menting recognition of her own particular kind of ignorance. When 
asked why Black characters seldom appear in her work, she replied 
"1 don't understand them the way I do white people. I don't feel 
capable of entering the mind of a Negro. In my stories they're 
seen from the outside" (qtd. in Feeley 91). Here, although she 
has given evidence in her writing of adequate knowledge of the 
Black idiom, she confesses to a more significant lack, for which 
not even sufficient knowledge of an idiom can compensate; knowl­
edge of the person himself, within his own immediate social 
context, of which the idiom is only a means of expression.
Of course, in this matter of whom she did and did not know 
sufficiently to make real in fiction, O'Connor's judgment was not 
infallible, a fact which she herself recognized, as the following 
anecdote, related by Richard Oilman demonstrates:
I wasn't surprised when [O'Connor] asked me if I 
thought she had "gotten right" the intellectual [Ray- 
ber] in The Violent Bear it Away. "I don't reckon he'd 
be very convincing to you folks in New York," she said.
202).
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I said, after wondering for a moment where I stood, no, 
he wasn't a very convincing intellectual and, growing 
bolder, that in fact I thought he was one of the few 
occasions when her art failed because she hadn't sacri­
ficed what she thought she knew. She was silent and 
then said she thought I was probably right (Conversa­
tions with FIannery 0'Connor 55).
Both of these brief incidents show how deeply O'Connor as a 
writer of fiction prized a thoroughly assimilated social environ­
ment which, for her, finally exists as much inside the writer as 
out, "in such a way that without changing their nature, they can 
be seen through one another" (IW 34). She writes that Art 
cannot exist without a "delicate adjustment" of this inner and 
outer world, an adjustment by which knowledge of oneself and 
knowledge of one's region and the world become identical. With 
the loss of such knowledge, and the writer's consequent inability 
to. see his country as part of himself, for D'Connor his value, 
both to himself and to his country, is also lost.
Such considerations demonstrate that, for O'Connor, as for 
Maritain, the universality of art can only materialize "at a 
peculiar crossroads where time and place and eternity somehow 
meet" (MM 59). There, the writer's "true country", the "eternal 
and absolute", will be made manifest, in the writer's portrayal 
of "the actual countryside . . . on to and through the peculiar 
characteristics of his region and his nation" (27).
2.15 On Asceticism and the Artist
For Maritain, the notion of a necessity for submission to a 
certain ascetic practice is tacit in the very word "artist." 
Without having acquired a formidable array of virtues— "humility
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and magnanimity, prudence, integrity, fortitude, temperance, 
simplicity, ingenuousness"—  (fl&5 78), not much is to be hoped 
for from a worker condemned to a nomadic existence, on terrain 
ever more difficult, presenting problems ever new. The same 
insecurity, from which others flee, must by him be sought as 
ceaselessly as he must cultivate his gift, resisting at any price 
the poison of easy success (A&S 78).
O'Connor strongly echoes these convictions, particularly in 
her statements about the artist's first duty being to his art.
She stresses that the ego's clamoring must be ignored when the 
artist, "usually [having] to suffer certain deprivations in order 
to use his gift with integrity" (MM 81), goes about his work. 
But if this gift become habitus is also a virtue, it is one for 
the practice of which other virtues (i.e., those listed above) 
are necessary. The acquisition of any virtue, however, "demands a 
certain asceticism and a very definite leaving-behind of the 
niggardly part of the ego" (81). This is a task which the liter­
ary artist, in O'Connor's view, cannot escape, for "the writer 
has to judge himself with a stranger's eye and a stranger's 
severity. The prophet in him has to see the freak" (81-82), a 
feat of vision requiring selflessness of a rare order, and a 
generous dose of that "violence of a single-minded respect for 
the truth" which O'Connor says is necessary to find in a thing 
"the spirit which makes it itself" (82). If "writing a novel is 
a terrible experience, during which the hair often falls out and 
the teeth decay" (77), certainly one may suspect that somfc- part 
of the suffering stems from the periodic or constant high or low- 
level skirmishing involved in keeping the ego at bay, if art is 
ultimately to emerge, like a triumphant army, from the fray.
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2.16 Conclusion
Reading in sequence A&S and the essays and letters of Flan­
nery O'Connor suggests that a mutually comfortable dialogue about 
art could have existed between her and Maritain, in spite of the 
great difference in background, education, and vocation. A point- 
by—point comparison of what the two had to say on the same sub­
jects immeasurably strengthens this impression, simultaneously 
affording delight in the contrast between Maritain's precise and 
restrained, although not infrequently poetic and imaginatively 
expressed considerations, and those of O'Connor, terse and mat­
ter— of-fact, on exactly the same subjects. Often, only the sty­
listic wrappings vary, e.g., the tone of the references, with 
Maritain employing cathedral builders and shoemakers, while 
O'Connor found useful mules, yard dogs, and owls (M.M 104-105) .
What, of real significance, does vary from Maritain to 
O'Connor is that she is writing not as a philosopher but as a 
practitioner of the art of fiction. And just as her fiction is 
rooted in what she knows, so also is what she has to say about 
the art she practices. She therefore confidently expands, within 
her own bailiwick, on what Maritain has written; he, however, 
certainly appears to be her springboard.
The impressive quality of the thinking of both Maritain and 
O'Connor on the specific subjects presented throughout this chap­
ter, for all the evident depth of learning, reflection, and 
experience which grounds it, is its clarity. And if Maritain and 
O'Connor convey their meaning successfu11y in part by employing 
references to shoemakers or mules, at the same time they show us 
that these are no less dustily pedestrian than art itself, nor
less, from another but not incompatible point of view, mysterious 
and sublime.
Notes
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Conversations Nith Flannery O'Connor.
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The Sign, 40 (March 1961), 46-48.
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Flannery O'Connor.
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Chapter III: Art and Scbolasticism Assimilated:
The Struggle and Its Fruit
In his book The Art of Fiction. John Gardner observes: 
"Trustworthy aesthetic universais do exist, but they exist at 
such a high level of abstraction as to offer almost no guidance 
to the writer" (3). Certainly, therefore, (and as a reading of 
implies) these universais cannot be imagined as formulas, 
technique, or method, making conveniently explicit those which 
according to Maritain are hidden rules, different for every work 
of art ever produced, comparable to "preexisting paths through a 
tangled thicket". To find these, in carrying through to its 
conclusion each of his projects, an artist must be willing to 
shun shortcuts, endure a certain amount of frustration, and 
accept a perhaps uncomfortable and prolonged proximity with his 
own limitations. Such an effort can only be sustained by the 
power of a single-minded love for the good of that which is 
coming into being, and which— once birthed— can begin to be 
perceived only insofar as it appeals to the senses.
In seeking the meaning of Flannery CD'Connor's "cutting her 
aesthetic teeth" on A&S, reference will be made to three points 
therein, as summarized above, i.e., 1) art always implies a 
struggle; 2) the completed project must appeal through the 
senses; 3) the power sustaining the will to struggle is a single- 
minded love for the project.
A practical demonstration of what Point 1 means in O'Con­
nor's case is presented first, based on a dispersed account of 
her own struggle, contained in the letters O'Connor wrote 
throughout both the writing and publication of the first of her
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two novels: Wise Blood. Point 2 will be developed by showing 
multiple examples from Wise Blood of □'Connor's capacity as a 
writer of fiction to appeal through the senses. Point 3 is demon­
strated in its effects, i.e., the conflicting interpretations 
generated by Wise Blood. which preclude its classification as 
propaganda for Catholicism.
3.1 Wise B 1ood: The Struggle
Wise Blood is the story of Hazel Motes, the descendent of a 
vociferous prophet/preacher grandfather, who ultimately fails in 
spite of vigorous efforts to reject the vocation corresponding to 
his spiritual legacy. O'Connor first refers to the novel'^ (HB
4) in a letter to Elizabeth McKee, the literary agent with whom 
she would be both associated professionally and linked in friend­
ship throughout the remainder her life. Dated June 19, 1948, the 
letter mentions that she has been working on WjB, two chapters of 
which have already appeared in magazines with a third about to do 
so, for a year and a half. O'Connor estimates that she will 
finish the novel in two more years. In passing, she characterizes 
herself as "a very slow worker" (5), emphasizing the point in 
the next letter to McKee (July 4, 1948): "I am a slow six months 
before the end of a first draft, and after that, I will be at 
least a year cleaning up" (5).
In the next letter (July 21, 1948) to McKee, O'Connor, 
perhaps because reference has been made to the possibility of an 
advance payment from the publisher, apparently feels it necessary 
to explain how she works:
I don't have my novel outlined and I have to write to 
discover what I am doing. Like the old lady, I don't 
know so well what I think until I see what I say; then
95
I have to say it over again. I am working on the 
twelfth chapter now. I long ago quit numbering the 
pages but I suppose I am past the 50,000 word mark. Of 
the twelve chapters only a few won't have to be re­
written; and I can't exhibit such formless stuff. It 
would discourage me to look at it right now and anyway
I yearn to go about my business to the end.........The
chapters I enclose should give you some idea. They are 
the best chapters in it. ( HB. 5-6)
On Feb. 3, 1949, O'Connor advises McKee that her main desire 
as far as publishing houses is concerned is to be "where they 
will take the book as I write it" (H^ 9). Unfortunately, the 
attitude described did not match that of Rinehart (the company 
holding an option on WJB as a result of O'Connor's having won the 
Rinehart-Iowa Fiction Award in 1947 (HB. 4)). This becomes clear 
to O'Connor after reading a letter from John Selby (editor— in­
chief of Rinehart), about the contents of which she comments to 
McKee: "The criticism is vague and really tells me nothing except 
that they don't like [W^]. I feel the objections they raise are 
connected with its virtues, and the thought of working with them 
specifically to correct these lacks they mention is repulsive to 
me" (9). She has the impression, furthermore, that Selby's 
letter has been addressed to a "slightly dim-witted Camp Fire 
Girl, and I cannot look with composure on getting a lifetime of 
others like them" (9). The letter leads O'Connor to believe that 
"Rinehart will not take the novel as it will be if left to my
t O'Connor reiterates this point, among other places in a letter
(Nov. 25, 1955) to "A.": "I never have anything balanced in my
head when I set out; if I did I'd resign this profession from 
boredom and operate a hatchery" (HB. 117).
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fiendish care (it will be essentially as it is) or that Rinehart 
would like to rescue it at this point and train it into a conven­
tional novel" (9).
In her reply (Feb. IB, 1949) to Selby, Q'Connor clearly 
affirms that hers must be the final word over the form WB will 
ultimately take;
I feel that whatever virtues the novel may have are 
very much connected with the limitations you mention. I 
am not writing a conventional novel, and I think that 
the quality of the novel I write will derive precisely 
from the peculiarity or aloneness, if you will, of the 
experience I write from. I do not think there is any 
lack of objectivity in the writing, however, if this is 
what your criticism implies; and also I do not feel 
that rewriting has obscured the direction. I feel it 
has given whatever direction is now present. (10)
This crisp rejection of Selby's analysis (with whatever loss 
it might imply for someone who was not financially independent) 
recalls Maritain's description of the artist's characteristic 
irritabi1ity: "all that deviates from the straight line of their 
object galls them; hence their intransigence - what concession 
could they admit of? They are fixed in an absolute" (A&S 12).
In this same letter, however, O'Connor also shows the other 
side of herself as artist, for whom the highest value is the good 
of the work, rather than the fact that the work is hers, the off­
spring of her own sovereign and self-sufficient creativity: "I am 
amenable to criticism but only within the sphere of what I am 
trying to do; I will not be persuaded . . . otherwise" (10).
These were not empty words. On April 7, 1949, she writes to 
Paul Engle (conductor of the School for Writers O'Connor had 
attended at the State University of Iowa) that before responding
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to Selby's letter, "rather than trust my own judgment entirely"
(hB 13) she had shown it to the poet Robert Lowell.
Lowell had already read the manuscript sent to Selby, and 
pointed out faults which O'Connor evidently recognized as such 
but which obviously did not coincide with those cited by Selby. 
Nor did Lowell concur with Selby's opinion. As for the fact that 
O'Connor had sought Lowell's counsel, it is used in the letter to 
Engle as a defense against Selby's insinuation that she was 
"working in a vacuum" (13). Obviously she took umbrage not only 
with those who would in her judgment mutilate her work, but also 
with suggestions that she was indiscriminately indifferent to 
criticism.
On October 17, 1949, six months after the letter to Engle, 
O'Connor writes to close college friend Betty Boyle that her only 
real desire is to finish WB., on which "[I am] writing about four 
hours every morning which I find is the maximum" (HB. 16). Her , 
concern continues during O'Connor's hospitalization, following 
her return to Georgia in December of 1950. A 1though 0'Connor had 
been sick enough for her mother, Regina, to have notified the 
Fitzgeralds that her daughter was dying, Sally Fitzgerald notes 
that "as she emerged from the crisis, debilitated by high fevers 
and the treatment alike" (HB 22), O'Connor began to write to 
her friends again, "chiefly on the subject of her novel, which 
had never been much out of her mind, even when the lupus attack 
was most severe" (22).
A brief letter to Elizabeth McKee illustrates Fitzgerald's 
point. Inexactly dated, but written while she was still interned 
in Atlanta's Emory University Hospital in January, 1951, O'Con­
nor's letter mentions her illness only in passing, describing it 
in a tidy, hardly foreboding little phrase: "the cortisone peri­
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od". During this, she explains, she "[managed] to finish the 
first draft of the novel" (HB 23), sending it thereafter to 
Sally Fitzgerald's husband. "He is satisfied that it is good and 
so am I," comments 0'Connor, adding that when she gets home she 
"[plans] to add an extra chapter and make some changes on a few 
others," observing that "it will all just take some time" (23).
On March 10, 1951, O'Connor writes to Robert Giroux, editor—  
in-chief of Harcourt, Brace and Company, which, because she found 
its attitude more congenial to her artistic convictions than 
Rinehart's, was now to publish W^. In her letter O'Connor ex­
presses the hope that Giroux will both like and publish the 
manuscript she has enclosed. Although anxious to see the book on 
the market that fall, she states: "I'm still open to suggestions 
about improving it and will welcome any you have" (HB. 23).
On that same day in 1951, O'Connor writes to Elizabeth McKee 
that, as far as she is concerned, the draft that she has sent to 
Giroux is the last, "unless there is something really glaring in 
it that may be pointed out to me" (H^ 24). This wording sug­
gests that, at least at the moment of writing, O'Connor felt a 
bit less patient about being done with than she had given
Giroux to understand.
Almost a full six months later (Sept. 1, 1951), however, in 
a letter to Mavis McIntosh, literary agent and partner of Eliza­
beth McKee in the firm of McIntosh and McKee, O'Connor reports 
that Giroux and her friend the novelist Caroline Gordon had made 
suggestions for improving the book, of which she has been produc­
ing a new draft "in spite of [having] been in and out of the 
hospital this summer and . . . too decrepit to type a hundred and 
fifty pages under a month" (H^ 25).
In mid-September of 1951, O'Connor writes the Fitzgeralds, 
enclosing what she calls "Opus Nauseous No. 1", and commenting
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that a day she had spent reading it "was like . . . [a] day 
[spent] eating a horse blanket" (HB. 27). Even so, she finds the 
manuscript "better than it was before" (27). She announces that 
it has been dispatched to Giroux, expresses doubt about his 
willingness to read it again, and asks the Fitzgeralds', opinion 
about whether Caroline Gordon might agree to; "All the changes 
are efforts after what she suggested . . . and I am much obliged 
to her. If you think she wouldn't mind, would you send this copy 
on to her . . . as I don't have another copy or her address"
(27). This last she requests in order to thank Gordon for having 
read the manuscript the first time, and adds, "I am also 
obliged . . . for your reading it again" (27). Certainly Flan­
nery Q'Connor valued greatly the opinion of these people, and did 
not intend to leave her gratitude to them in doubt.
The Fitzgeralds, for their part, quickly forwarded O'Con­
nor's manuscript to Gordon, whose response reached O'Connor 
shortly thereafter in the form of "some nine pages of comments" 
(HB 28). These, O'Connor presently reports back to the Fitzger­
alds, "certainly increased my education . . . . So I am doing 
some more things to [WB] and then I mean to send it off for the 
LAST [sic] time" (28).
But by Oct. 16, 1951, together with the revised manuscript 
being sent to Giroux, a brief note states that, having "tried to 
clear up the foggier places" and to make the changes suggested by 
Gordon, O'Connor considers WB better, although she has "no one to 
read it who could tell me" (H^ 28). She adds that, if he is not 
satisfied, "I'd like to work on it again," mentioning in a post­
script that the Fitzgeralds "have agreed to undergo another 
session with it" (28).
One month later, on Nov. 23, 1951, in yet another letter to
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Giroux O'Connor declares that, in accordance with yet more recent 
suggestions of Caroline Gordon, she wants to "do some more 
to . . . three or four places she has mentioned" ( 2 9 )  if 
the novel has not yet been set up for printing, beyond the point 
where alterations are possible. Evidently Giroux was able to 
accommodate her, because on Dec. 3, 1951, she writes him again:
"I am enclosing the changes and I will be much obliged . . .  if 
you can get them substituted at the printers. I think they make a 
lot of difference" (29). She adds, "I had a good many more for 
the first chapter but I presume it is too late for that. Caroline 
[Gordon] thought that some places went too fast for anyone to get 
them" (29).
O'Connor is even prepared, within the limits of her possi­
bilities, to suffer a financial loss if these changes can be 
implemented; "About how much can I mess around on the proofs 
without costing myself a lot of money? Fifteen percent of the 
cost of composition doesn't mean anything to me" (HB 29). But, 
while simultaneously trying to avoid exasperating Giroux, she is 
precise in negotiating: "What I want to know is; how many para­
graphs (approximately) could I insert?" (29).
On Jan.23, 1952, O'Connor sends Giroux the galleys and manu­
script, expressing the hope that the "corrections and insertions 
are plain and not too numerous" (HB 30), and giving credit to 
Gordon for all of these most recent changes. She says she likes 
the sample page and ends her note with a likely question (the 
novel was to have been finished by June, 1951): "When is this 
book supposed to come out?" (30).
But however anxious she is to see W^ finally in print, on 
Feb. 24, she returns both galleys and marked page proofs to Gi­
roux, announcing that she has made "insignificant changes on 
pages 20, 26, and 185, which you can dispense with if they would
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cost the printer any unhappiness or me any money" (HB 32).
Finally, on March 12, 1952, O'Connor adds the final touch to 
WB; in response to a query of Giroux, she dedicates the book to 
her mother, Regina. Two hundred thirty pages in the twenty-third 
printing (1990), had been distilled from two thousand pages of
manuscript (Montgomery 23).
As the excerpts from O'Connor's letters thus far presented 
show, producing her first novel had required mammoth effort. A 
great deal of writing had been done, of which apparently every­
thing in the final product had previously been submitted by 
O'Connor, in successive drafts, to the judgment of her esteemed 
inter1ocutors, as her letters until thé time of W^'s publication 
demonstrate. At the same time, they make clear O'Connor's single- 
minded determination that the project be brought to a fruition 
satisfactory in the first place to herself. If rejecting what she 
regarded as irrelevant criticism, at whatever cost and no matter 
from whom it came, while frankly seeking other criticism and 
implementing suggestions until virtually the eve of publication, 
was part of the price of bringing about the maximum good of UIB. 
O'Connor evidently was prepared to pay it without hesitation. On 
behalf of WB., she appeared to be as tireless as she was fearless.
Even so, and in spite of the great effort she had put into 
her novel, more than three years later O'Connor writes to "A." 
(Nov. 25, 1955): "I was five years writing that book, and up to 
the last I was sure it was a failure and didn't work" ( HB. 117). 
She writes here of a feeling for which she does not specifically 
account. What she does reveal, however, is the extent to which 
her health had been debilitated by the campaign to get WB into 
print:
When W^ was finished I came down with my energy-de-
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priving ailment and began to take cortisone in large 
doses and cortisone makes you think night and day until 
I suppose the mind dies of exhaustion if you are not 
rescued. I was, but during this time I was more or less 
living my life and H. Mote's [sic] too and as my dis­
ease affected the joints, I conceived the notion that I 
would eventually become paralized [sic] and was going 
blind and that in the book I had spelled out my own 
course, or that in the illness I had spelled out the 
book. (HB 117-18)
Following recovery, and with WB. now available to the reading 
public, O'Connor acquired additional inter 1ocutors with whom she 
could consider at leisure some of the difficulties with which she 
had battled during the novel's five-year gestation ( 8 1 ) .  For: 
example, in a letter (November 25, 1955) to her friend "A.," 
O'Connor cites as a problem Hazel Motes, in contrast with his 
double Enoch Emory, of whom she writes, "[about him] I never had 
a moment's thought" (117), for "everything Enoch said and did 
was as plain to me as my hand" (117).
Hazel, on the other hand, "seems to be the failure of the 
novel" (HB. 116). O'Connor comments in a previous letter to "A." 
(Oct. 20, 1955) that a writer named George Clay has written, in 
response to her request that he read WB., that it had "bored and 
exasperated him because H. Motes was not human enough to sustain 
his interest" (HB. 111). O'Connor writes, "I think he is in a 
sense correct," explicating no further. (She does, however, 
declare that she is trying "to make this new novel [The Vio1en t 
Bear It Away] more human, less farcical," (111) which effort she 
describes as "a great strain for me.")
In another letter (Nov. 10, 1955) to "A.," O'Connor writes 
that Motes "is not believable enough as a human being to make his
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blinding himself believable for the reasons that he did it," 
i.e., as a sacrifice to which he was called by God, in the same 
way that Abraham was called to sacrifice his son. As O'Connor 
analyzes the trouble, "for the things . . .  I want them to do, my 
characters apparently will have to seem twice as human as humans" 
(HB 116). But arriving at this perception is, O'Connor recog­
nizes, as far she can go; "it's a problem not solved by the will; 
if I am able to do anything about it, it will simply be something 
given."* And she admits; "I never understand how writers can 
succumb to vanity - what you work the hardest on is usually the 
worst" (116).
As previously seen, WB had been started in January of 1947, 
whereas not until December, 1950, is any reference made in HB to 
A&S. Therefore, at least for something more than forty percent of 
the time spent in writing WJB, O'Connor had been aware from her 
reading of Maritain that struggle is simply the artist's lot, a 
consequence of art's nature or, in today's parlance, part of the 
process. Therefore, armed with the theory necessary to be able to 
manage her difficulties without undue discouragement, she had 
been prepared to attack them rationally, rather than allowing 
them to undermine her confidence in her gift and, consequently, 
her capacity to see WB through to a sufficiently satisfactory 
conclusion. If she had occasion to reflect on her experience as 
it accumulated during the writing of WJB, perhaps she herself may
>K O'Connor expresses this same belief in a subsequent letter to 
"A" (Nov. 25, 1955); after explaining why the category of male- 
female relations have not entered her fiction thematically ("My 
inability to handle [this] so far in fiction may be purely per—  
sonal, as my upbringing has smacked a little of Jansenism even if 
my convictions do not"), she states her intention to continue 
avoiding the subject, regarded by her as "the center of life and 
most holy, . . . until I feel that what I can do with it will be 
right, which is to say, given" (HB. 117).
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have perceived in it a clear image of what Maritain had so vivid­
ly described in A&S. and found consolation in the relationship.
3.2 Wise B 1ood; Assault on the Senses
Recall that Maritain, after his initially reluctant attribu­
tion of a role to the senses in the perception of beauty, con­
cludes by admitting that "the beautiful . . . connatural to man 
is the beautiful that delights the intellect through the senses 
and through their intuition" (24). O'Connor frequently refers to 
the consequences of this principle— one which she fully 
shared— as has been seen in chapter two.
Perhaps this certainty can in part be ascribed to O'Connor's 
known ability for painting and cartooning, examples of the latter 
of which appear, during her undergraduate years, in Georgia Col­
lege's student publications. Years later, in a letter dated 
August 27, 1963, addressed to her Catholic schoolteacher friend, 
Janet McKane, O'Connor refers to her fondness for cartoons, 
making this disclosure; "I used to try to do [cartoons] myself, 
sent a batch every week to the NeiM Yorker, all rejected of 
course. I just couldn't draw very well. I like the ones that are 
drawn well better than the situations" (HB 536).
O'Connor's letters also reveal her permanent interest in 
painting, both her own and others'. In the same letter to Janet 
McKane, for instance, O'Connor expresses her thanks for some 
"museum bulletins with devilish dogs" and comments on a dog she 
particularly likes in an unnamed painting of Rousseau; "[T]he 
family is in a wagon, all looking ahead and there is one dog in 
the wagon and one underneath, kind of prim diabolical dogs. It's 
very funny" (H^ 536). Another comment to McKane (June 19,
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1963), made on O'Connor's se1f-portrait in the company of a 
pheasant cock "with horns and a face like the Devil", besides 
demonstrating her continuing activity as a painter, suggests a 
grimmer layer to O'Connor's humor;
CIt] was made ten years ago, after a very acute siege 
of lupus. I was taking cortisone which gives you what 
they call a moon—face and my hair had fallen out to a 
large extent from the high fever, so 1 looked pretty 
much like the portrait. When I painted it I didn't look 
either at myself in the mirror or at the bird. I knew 
what we both looked like. (HB. 525)
Other remarks in HjB indicate a wry, benignly self- 
deprecating attitude towards her own ability as a painter, conso­
nant with O'Connor's interpretation of her point of view of 
reality, as expressed in a letter to the writer John Hawkes: "I 
think the basis of the way I see is comic regardless of what I do 
with it" (HB 400).
O'Connor's comic way of seeing things plus talent for car­
tooning and painting blend in what is at least partially their 
product; WjB. In virtually every paragraph, in almost every char­
acter and situation, O'Connor seems to cartoon in words what she 
finds herself perhaps inadequately equipped to represent by 
drawing. Thus, although in using the resources of writing she of 
course achieves effects that go beyond what would be communicable 
in cartoons, when one imagines WE[ dramatized, cartoon animation 
suggests itself immediately. The first chapter alone, for exam­
ple, seems to cry out for such treatment.
Hazel Motes, a recently discharged veteran, sits on a "green 
plush train seat" (9), face to face with Mrs. Wally Bee Hitch­
cock, a matron en route to Florida for a visit with her married 
daughter's family. O'Connor describes Mrs. Hitchcock in her
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habitually brief Btrokes: "a fat woman with pink collars and 
cuffs and pear— shaped legs that slanted off the train seat and 
didn't reach the floor" (9).
The second sentence preceding this description shows, out­
side the train window, plowed fields, in the furrows of which 
nose a "few hogs . . . [looking] like large spotted stones" (9). 
Hogs, however, are not as easily associated with "large spotted 
stones" as they are with three elements— "fat", "pink", "pear- 
shaped"— in Mrs. Hitchcock's description. Therefore, the fresh 
echo of the word "hogs", comparatively weakly linked to "large 
spotted stones", clicks instantly in the reader's mind into the 
firm niche provided by Mrs. Hitchcock's description. Thus, in 
this indirect way, the reader is led to perceive her as more 
porcine than the hogs themselves. But portraying Mrs. Hitchcock 
requires borrowing yet a further characteristic from another 
member of the bestiary: O'Connor describes Mrs. Hitchcock's face 
as "reddish, under a cap of fox-colored hair" (11).
When Motes collides with Mrs. Hitchcock, her eyes "squinted 
nearly shut"— therefore small, like pigs' eyes— in a corridor of 
the train after dinner, she has prepared to retire, and is 
dressed in "a pink wrapper, with her hair in knots around her 
head" (18). On second glance, however, the "knots" resemble more 
closely "knobs [which frame] her face like dark toadstools", a 
simile suggesting not only poison but also dampness and the smell 
of decaying vegetation. This sinister association, combined with 
the rage evidenced by the purpling of Mrs. Hitchcock's face 
"except for little white marks over it that didn't heat up", 
reveals the matron completely shorn of her persona.
Mrs. Hitchcock's speech is similarly reduced to the bare 
bones customarily found in cartoon balloons as, "drawing herself
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stiff", she demands; "What is the matter with you?" (18). In 
fact, the whole of Mrs. Hitchcock's discourse is eminently suited^ 
to animation. Even reported, it is obviously composed of conver—  
sational cliches, expressed in brief sentences of corresponding 
grammatical simplicity, gushingly delivered:
[Mrs. Hitchcock] told [Hazel] she had been a Miss 
Weatherman before she married and that she was going to 
Florida to visit her married daughter, Sarah Lucile.
She said it seemed like she had never had time to take 
a trip that far off. The way things happened, one thing 
after another, it seemed like time went by so fast you 
couldn't tell if you were young or old. (13) 
Communications of similar style and content are addressed to 
Motes during the novel's first scene, despite his obvious lack of 
interest, and in spite of Mrs. Hitchcock's evident indifference, 
and even hostility towards Motes himself, about whom— certainly 
for lack of any other entertainment— she merely indulges a curi­
osity as trivial as it is vigorous.
When Motes simply ignores Mrs. Hitchcock's second conversa­
tional overture (he had done likewise with the first), the level 
of her response shows more about her than it does about Motes: 
irked by his aloofness, she "wrenched her attention [from his 
face] and squinted at the price tag [on the sleeve of his 
jacket]. The suit had cost him $11.98. She felt that placed him 
and looked at his face again as if she were fortified against him 
now" (10). This sequence of primary action and matching 
emotion— Hitchcock's sublime complacency, the sudden contortion 
of her features, the eyes trained on the price tag, smug satis­
faction at the sight of "$11.98" suddenly smoothing her 
face— constitute the very type of elementary material appropriate 
for animation, as is, for example, the description of the singu-
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lar Hazel Motes.
Although Mrs. Hitchcock estimates Motes to be "not much over 
twenty", no other detail either of his appearance or his behavior 
supports her calculation. On the contrary, he could easily be 
middle-aged: "The outline of a skull under his skin was plain and 
insistent" (10). His eyes are "the color of pecan shells and set 
in deep sockets", and his nose resembles "a shrike's bill" which 
is, according to Webster's Ninth New Col 1eoiate Pictionarv. 
strongly notched and hooked at the tip, and often used to impale 
insects on thorns. In addition, he had "a long vertical crease on 
either side of his mouth", and "his hair looked as if it had been 
permanently flattened under [his] heavy hat" (10). As for his 
outfit, besides the hat, "stiff black [and] broad-brimmed . . . 
[like one] an elderly preacher would wear", there was the suit, 
of "glaring blue" (10), with the price tag still on the sleeve.
Motes's utterances, consistently curt and uncivil, show him 
thoroughly absorbed by some inner debate, both sides of which he 
seems to argue unceasingly. Thus, except as he can relate them to 
his own conflict or interests. Motes is virtually inaccessible to 
others, e.g. his first words to Mrs. Hitchcock, after her three 
futile attempts to engage him in conversation, only announce his 
departure: "I got to go see the porter" (11).
Motes is less niggardly of speech in his interaction with 
the black porter, who is, incidentally, the only figure in the 
first chapter who is not described with allusions to animals. The 
porter— as reluctant to converse with Motes as Motes is to con­
verse with Mrs. Hitchcock— in accordance with his professional 
duties withstands as best he can Motes's bullying invasion of his 
privacy. For Motes's bullet-like assertions aim at extracting 
from the porter a confession that he is "a Parrum nigger from
109
Eastrod" (12). This appalling attempt to label the porter drives 
him at length out of his retreat to silence: "I'm from 
Chicago . . . .  My name is not Parrum" (18). To which Haze 
cynically responds, "Cash (the name of the porter's purported 
father) is dead. . . .  He got the cholera from a pig" (18). The 
porter's mouth, "[jerking] down", reveals an emotion concealed by 
the simple dignity of his reply; "My father was a railroad man" 
(19). Hazel's basic hostility to others, conveyed only by his 
leaden silence in the presence of Mrs. Hitchcock's chirping, is 
here fully expressed in discourse typical, in both form (terse) 
and content (noxious), of what emanates from Haze's mouth 
throughout the novel. His share in the dining car dialogue pro­
vides another example.
With his stiff black hat still planted on his head (it 
remains there, fixed solid, throughout the dining car episode). 
Motes— after an awkward half-hour's wait which he spends staring 
at the wall while Mrs. Hitchcock chatters on at his side with a 
new partner in conversation— is conducted to a seat in the rear 
of the car by a waiter compared by O'Connor to a crow. Although 
this simile is formally applied only to the waiter's "darting" 
movements, the previous sentence describes him as "a white man 
with greased black hair and a greased black look to his suit" 
(15). Thus, the reader's imagination, rather than the text it­
self, links this description to "crow", in the same way that it 
does "hog" to Mrs. Hitchcock.
Hazel Motes, in the company of his somewhat lurid table 
mates, "three youngish women dressed like parrots", whose hands 
rested on the table "red-speared at the tips", quickly demon­
strates through his behavior a Puritan streak combining neatly 
with his preacher's hat. On the other hand, as far as insolence 
is concerned, in these women he more than meets his match. The
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woman opposite him, with a "bold game-hen expression and small 
eyes pointed directly at him", at intervals blows cigarette smoke 
directly into Hazel's face, while he— "glum and intense"—  ob­
serves fixedly her neck.
In the subsequent exchange, Motes finds himself in a worse 
position than Mrs. Hitchcock had been with him. Like her, he 
speaks three times before a reply is conceded, perhaps unexpect­
edly so to the reader, considering that his conversational gam­
bits are a good deal less conventional than Mrs. Hitchcock's; 1) 
"If you've been redeemed, • . . 1  wouldn't want to be"; 2) "Do 
you think I believe in Jesus?"; 3) "I wouldn't believe even if He 
existed. Even if He was on this train" (16). In reply, a "poi­
sonous Eastern voice" asks, "Who said you had to?" (16). At this 
point the conversation terminates, because the sole issue that 
interests Motes has been dismissed as insignificant.
Hazel's intense state of inner absorption is further sug­
gested in this scene by the inexact description of his dinner, as 
if "something spotted with eggs and livers" (17) represents the 
clearest perception he was at liberty to register. This image, on 
one hand too unusual and precise not to be visualized by the 
reader, and on the other suggesting something amorphous and 
perhaps i 11-sme 11 i n g , combines harmoniously with the other 
unpleasant details making up the episode in the dining car.
Throughout W^, curt references to Jesus abound (relatively 
few pages have no reference at all to religion). These begin in
)K Another sketch describes "something in [Hazel's] throat like a 
sponge with an egg taste", and sufficiently substantial that "he 
didn't want to turn over for fear it would move" (19). Again, 
this description is so graphic and unusual that the attentive 
reader cannot escape imagining it and, if he is also the least 
bit empathetic, feeling it in his throat as well.
i l l
the uncivil exchange at the table in the dining car and continue 
in the report, in chapter one, of Hazel's dream, in which figures 
his grandfather, a circuit preacher described as "a waspish old 
man who had ridden over three counties with Jesus hidden in his 
head like a stinger" (20). In the case of Hazel, however, the 
relationship with Jesus is more ominously imagined:
Jesus [is moving] from tree to tree in the back of his 
mind, a wild ragged figure motioning him to turn around 
and come off into the dark where he was not sure of his 
footing, where he might be walking on the water and not 
know it and then suddenly know it and drown. (22)
Thus, Hazel's Jesus is a threat to himself, whereas his grandfa­
ther's Jesus is a threat to others. But both versions are as 
sharply drawn as those of the other hostile characters met so 
far.
WB.'s females throughout the entire novel are evoked with the 
same sharp strokes used in the creation of Mrs. Wally Bee Hitch­
cock. Mrs. Leora Watts, for example, advertised "in a drunken- 
looking hand" (30) on the wall next to the toilet paper in a 
public bathroom stall as having "the friendliest bed in town", is 
first presented as seen by Hazel through an opening in a door, 
sitting on her white iron bed "cutting her toenails with a large 
pair of scissors" (33). She is a "big woman with very yellow 
hair and white skin that glistened with a greasy preparation. She 
had on a pink nightgown that would better have fit a smaller 
figure" (33). In spite of her subject, O'Connor's reporting 
seems thoroughly objective, as if she were describing the appear­
ance of a judge, a senator, or a prelate.
From his hiding place behind the door, Hazel makes a noise, 
heard by Mrs. Watts. Her reaction shows her to be both brazen and 
lackadaisical, resembling therefore the three "youngish" women on
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the train, who were parrot-like in dress: "She had a bold steady 
penetrating stare. After a minute, she turned it away from 
[Motes] and began cutting her toenails again" (33).
Once in the room, Motes observes "the bed and a bureau and a 
rocking chair full of dirty clothes" (33). He "fingered, a nail 
file and then an empty jelly glass while he looked into the 
yellowish mirror and watched Mrs. Watts, slightly distorted, 
grinning at him" (33). In spite of the dishevelment of both Mrs. 
Watts and her room. Hazel finds "[h]is senses stirred to the 
limits" (33) and commences his amorous approximation by sitting 
on the far corner of her bed, while sliding his hand along the 
sheet until it encounters her foot, "heavy but not cold" (33). 
Mrs. Watts mouth then "[splits] in a wide full grin that showed 
her teeth. They were pointed and speckled with green and there 
was a side space between each one" (33-34). (Evidently nothing, 
either in Mrs. Watts' appearance, the scene, or the episode as a 
whole would offer much of a challenge to a cartoon animator.)
Another woman, a daily swimmer in the public pool of the 
city park, and always accompanied by two small boys, is described 
as wearing "a stained white bathing suit that fit her like a 
sack" (81-82). Her face is "long and cadaverous, with a bandage­
like bathing cap coming down almost to her eyes, and sharp teeth 
protruding from her mouth" (84). Her foot, as seen emerging from 
the pool, is "large", and once out of the pool, she 
"[squats] . . . , panting" (84-85). She stands up "loosely and 
[shakes] herself, stamping in the water dripping off her", then, 
grinning at Hazel and his companion Enoch Emory, she "[pads] over 
to a spot almost directly under where they [are] sitting" (85). 
This nameless woman, dog-like in her movements (loose shaking, 
stamping, squatting, panting, padding), careless, suggestive of
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sickness and death in her appearance and of licentiousness in her 
behavior, does not improve upon closer inspection. The bathing 
cap removed reveals her hair to be "short and matted and all 
colors, from deep rust to a greenish yellow", and when she again 
grins at Hazel, it is through "pointed teeth" (85). (Mrs. Leora 
Watts's teeth, as has been seen, are also pointed.)
Hazel's landlady hardly compels more admiration: "[She was] 
past her middle years and her plate was too large but she had 
long race-horse legs and a nose that had been called Grecian by 
one boarder. She wore her hair clustered like grapes on her brow 
and over each ear and in the middle behind" (220).
In the course of O'Connor presents three scenes involv­
ing waitresses, and these fare no better than the other women as 
far as their appearances or manners are concerned. The first 
waitress works in a place called the "Frosty Bottle", inside of 
which is "a dark room with a counter across the back of it and 
brown stools like toad stools in front of the counter" (88). In 
front of the entrance, on the opposite wall there was a "large 
advertisement for ice cream, showing a cow dressed up like a 
housewife" (88). The waitress, in brutal contrast, is described 
as having "bobbed hair like a man's", as well as "a man's face 
and big muscled arms" (88-89). Clad in a "once-white uniform 
clotted with brown stains" (88), she acknowledges Hazel's 
presence with a "sour" look. Before he can give her his order, 
however, Enoch announces in a soft voice, "I want a chocolate 
malted milk, babygirl" (89).
This woman is graceless as the swimmer in the park, but 
whereas licentiousness is hinted at by the swimmer's grinning, 
ferocity distinguishes the waitress's manner: she turns "fierce­
ly", she "glares", she "thumps the malted milk on the counter" 
and "roars" (90). Her name is Maude, she "[drinks] whiskey all
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day from a fruit jar under the counter", and she talks like a 
thug, e.g. "I know a clean [boy] when I see him and I know a son 
a bitch [sic] when I see him and there's a heap of difference and 
that pus-marked bastard zlurping [sic] through that straw is a 
goddamned son a bitch" (91).
But these words, addressed to Hazel, meet with the same 
indifference met by Mrs. Hitchcock's. In response to the single 
word "clean", however. Hazel again returns indirectly to the 
subject of Jesus, saying, "I AM clean", though "without any 
expression of his face or in his voice, just looking at the woman 
as if he were looking at a wall" (91). Whereupon the waitress 
stares at him, "startled and then outraged. She "[yells]", she 
swears, she screams; "You bastard! . . . what do you think I care 
about any of you filthy boys?" (92).
The second waitress is part of a scene in a drugstore in 
which the combination of pink and green is repeated four times in 
a single paragraph. Thus, 1) the fountain counter was of "pink 
and green marble linoleum"; 2) the waitress behind it had "a 
lime-colored uniform and a pink apron"; 3) she was red-headed and 
had "green eyes set in pink"; and 4) the picture in back of her 
showed a "Lime-Cherry Surprise", that day's special, at ten cents 
each (136-37). The posture of the waitress, however, suggests 
something of the aggressiveness of her masculine predecessor in 
the "Frosty Bottle"; "she laid her chest on the counter and 
surrounded it by her folded arms" (137). When the speech of 
Enoch— an eighteen-year-old newcomer to the city, employed as a 
public worker in the zoo— begins to escape her comprehension, the 
waitress's movements wax unruly: she "jerks" a stale Lime-Cherry 
Surprise from under his nose, begins "slapping things together", 
and presently "[slams] another" in front of him (137).
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The third waitress is employed in the "Paris Diner", de­
scribed as "a tunnel about six feet wide, located between a shoe 
shine parlor and a dry-cleaning establishment" (192). In the 
diner, Enoch orders something as colorfully appetizing as the 
Lime-Cherry Surprise he left untouched in the drugstore; "a bowl 
of split-pea soup and a chocolate malted milkshake" (192).
The waitress is described as "a tall woman with a big yellow 
dental plate and the same color hair done up in a black hairnet" 
(192). One of her hands seems permanently affixed to her hip, 
while the other writes down orders. But in Enoch's case she 
simply ignores his request, and proceeds to fry bacon, apparently 
for herself, since the only other customer in the house has 
already finished dinner. When Enoch tells the waitress that he is 
in a hurry, she says, "Bo then" and "her jaw [begins] to work [as 
she stares] into the skillet with a fixed attention" (192). 
Tailoring his order to her lack of interest, Enoch requests a 
"piece of theter [sic] cake yonder", described as "pink and 
yellow . . . on a round glass stand" (193), which the waitress 
at length "[torpedoes]" down the counter to him. Preceding 
Enoch's departure, the waitress— in response to his announcing 
that she may not see him again— says; "Any way I don't see you 
will be all right with me" (194).
The other characters presented throughout the novel are 
equally unpleasant, and drawn with identically brief strokes. 
Thus, the welfare woman who "traded [Enoch] from [his] daddy 
"[S]he was forty year old-but she sho was ugly. She had theseyer 
brown glasses and her hair was so thin it looked like ham gravy 
trickling over her skull" (47).
In a street, an unnamed little man makes his transient 
appearance; "lost in a pair of faded overalls", he "jostled" 
Enoch, who "growled", "Whyn't you look where you going?" (46-
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47). In response, "Ct]he little man stopped and raised his arm in 
a vicious gesture and a nasty-dog look came on his face. 'Who you 
tellin' what?' he snarled" (47).
Hoover Shoats, alias Onnie Jay Holy, is described, initially 
at least, as ever— smiling. He is "plumpish", with "curly blond 
hair . . . cut with showy side burns", and wears "a black suit 
with a silver stripe in it and a wide-brimmed white hat pushed 
onto the back of his head" (147). With his "tight-fitting black 
pointed shoes and no socks", he looks like "an ex-preacher turned 
cowboy, or an ex—cowboy turned mortician. He was not handsome but 
under his smile, there was an honest look that fitted into his 
face like a set of false teeth" (148).
The supposedly blind preacher, Asa Hawks, is a "tall, cadav­
erous man with a black suit and a black hat on" (39). He wore 
dark glasses and "his cheeks were streaked with lines that looked 
as if they had been painted on and had faded. They gave him the 
expression of a grinning mandril" (39).
The only relatively savory character in the entire cast of 
WB is the black-— he is otherwise spared description--porter in 
chapter one. This figure who, as has been seen, retains his 
dignity throughout Hazel Motes' degrading in terrogation, yields 
only once to the temptation to be ironic, and even then, with 
elegant brevity. The remainder of the characters are portrayed as 
ugly, either in behavior or appearance, if not both. In short, 
humanity in general, as well as its habitat, comes off as rich 
material for enterprising animators; the world is a one­
dimensional place; objects are glaringly presented in primary 
colors; creatures bereft of nuance speak in language the grammat­
ical level of which hardly exceeds in complexity that found in a 
first-grade reader; action tends towards various gradations of
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the violent. And it is continuous, vigorous, lunatic as the 
action in a disturbing dream: a car (the Essex), pushed by a 
patrolman, plummets from an embankment (209); a tubercular false 
prophet (Solace Layfield), having been judged a liar by another 
false prophet (Hazel Motes), is murdered in ghastly steps (204- 
05); a mummy is stolen from a glass case in the zoo and installed 
in a "tabernacle-like cabinet . . . meant to contain a slop-jar" 
(131); a woman, "white . . . [and] squirming a little" (62) 
lies in something looking very much like a coffin, lined in 
black, inside a circus carnival tent, impressing the twelve-year- 
old Hazel for a second as "a skinned animal . . . .  She was fat 
and she had a face like an ordinary woman except there was a mole 
on the corner of her lip, that moved when she grinned, and one on 
her side" (62); a nasty man in a gorilla suit is murdered (195) 
because Enoch, the unfortunate zoo employee, both hates him and 
envies the "popularity" of Gonga, the gorilla he impersonates. 
Finally, an episode, as stunningly cruel as it is most easily 
visualized, from Enoch's childhood: at the age of four, he had 
received a tin box from his father, returned from a penitentiary. 
This box was "orange and had a picture of some peanut brittle on 
the outside of it and green letters that said, A NUTTY SURPRISE! 
When Enoch had opened it, a coiled piece of steel had sprung out 
at him and broken off the ends of his two front teeth" [178].
If art must first appeal through the senses, WB. does so from 
the first paragraph to the last. The novel's images continually 
bombard the eyes of the reader's mind; the staccato of the speech 
drums at the ears; the rhythm of the prose is never lost: unfail­
ing, it lures the reader on, perhaps in many cases in spite of 
his revulsion to the world WB. describes.
Nothing slows the novel's vigorous pace. To find an even 
conceivably unnecessary word in such a concisely wrought text
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would surely be a feat, for O'Connor had weeded her prose with 
unwavering attention and very well-kept tools, a capacity which 
Robert Fitzgerald attributed to a quality regarded by Maritain as 
indispensable to the artist: '
Ascesis . . . seems to me a good [word] for the pecul­
iar discipline of the O'Connor style. How much has been 
refrained from, and how much else has been cut out and 
thrown away, in order that the bald narrative sentences 
should present just what they present and in just this, 
order. (36)
Surely, then, O'Connor knew her way, in every word and 
phrase, to the reader's senses, a capacity which by the proposi­
tions of A&S itself, must be attributed solely to O'Connor's 
habitus: that indelible consequence of the steady exercise of her 
gift. Her art compels the constant attention of her reader's eye 
and ear as she relentlessly engages his imagination with her 
bizarre comedy. Having become the artist thàt she had made of 
herself, no other result was possible.
3.3 Wise Blood ; Offspring of an Undivided Will
Besides her lingering doubts about the effectiveness of her 
portrayal of Hazel Motes (discussed in section 3.1, pages 104-
05), O'Connor's other post-publication concern has to do with 
WB's "[standing] on its own feet" (HB 442). Apparently "A." has 
been trying to persuade her to supply the second edition with an 
introduction announcing "the religious significance of the book" 
(442). O'Connor, in reply (June 10, 1961), sharply limits the 
distance she is willing to go in that direction: "1 would want no 
more said about that than that the book is seen from the stand­
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point of orthodox Christianity" (442). She continues: "Explana­
tions are repugnant to me and to send out a book with directions 
for its enjoyment is terrible" (442). And if she does write a 
note to the second edition of WB, "it will be very light and 
oblique. No claims and very few assertions" (442), and this she 
writes in spite of her readiness to say of Catholics "we possess 
the truth in the Church" (MM 151). For O'Connor had learned in 
A&S that an artist's sole duty is to his work, rather than to 
edify readers— however pious— who lack the "fundamental equipment 
to read in the first place" (MM 151). This principle, which 
O'Connor seems to have grasped immediately and adopted irreversi­
bly, certainly influenced the elaboration of what she finally 
delivered for publication.
This much mulled-over note preceding the second edition 
characterizes WE[ as a "comic novel about a Christian malgre lul"
(5), written by an author "congenitally innocent of theory". 
O'Connor does, however, attribute to herself "certain preoccupa­
tions", which— one deduces from the next line— include "belief in 
Christ . . . [as] a matter of life and death" (5). As for a 
comic novel's including weighty matter, that is a simple condi­
tion of its existence, at least if the novel is any good.
In the case of WB, the readers' attitude towards its specif­
ic "matter of life and death" for O'Connor divides them into two 
groups: those for whom Motes' efforts to free himself from an 
unwanted vocation constitute his integrity, and those for whom 
his integrity is the consequence of his failure to do so. But she 
pursues this line of thought no further, preferring simply to 
state her own belief: integrity can in fact consist in failure, 
"for free will does not mean one will, but many wills conflicting 
in one man" (5). In any case, she concludes: "Freedom cannot be 
conceived simply. It is a mystery and one which a novel, even a
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comic novel, can only be asked to deepen" (5). If readers inter—  
pret in opposite ways, that is only to be expected, for a 
mystery amounts to just that: something about which no final 
agreement is possible.
Considering the fervent Catholic O'Connor was, the note, in 
which she identifies herself only indirectly as a Christian, 
ultimately evidences a certain ease in acknowledging and dealing 
with the differences between the reading given her novel by 
fellows in faith and that of readers of no, or other, religious 
persuasions. She hardly seems surprised that WB is ample enough, 
in its possibilities for interpretation, to accommodate both 
groups, even if for her a "stumbling block" (of undescribed 
consequences and consequently unknown gravity) exists for readers 
who attribute no importance to the life and person of Jesus 
Christ. But O'Connor, by terminating her note in considerations 
about free will as mystery, simply removes the discussion to a 
level at which belief suddenly becomes irrelevant, hystery by its 
nature defies human understanding, and the function of comic 
novels, she implies, is not to decipher puzzles of such magni­
tude .
Even this open-ended note seems, however, to have been 
written only after a long reluctance only gradually overcome. 
O'Connor confides in a letter dated Nov. 28, 1961, ( WB.'s second 
edition was published in 1962) to the writer and her personal 
friend John Hawkes, that she has not yet written the note, having 
thought "I am wasting my time saying what I've written when I've 
already written it . . . .  I couldn't hope to convince anybody 
anyway" (HB 457).
Whether convincing others interested her or not, she does 
not mention. But the evidence suggests that O'Connor would have
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been happy to remain mute, letting the book come through as it 
would to each of its readers, as does a painting, a sculpture, or 
the very universe itself; open to interpretation, its creator 
discretely concealed. The note that O'Connor finally writes, in 
its inconclusiveness, evidences her belief in WB_'s power to stand 
alone, and in its brevity implies that, if for whatever reason 
she was not able to remain discretely concealed, at least-- 
having paid tribute to her own belief— she would ultimately leave 
her readers free to interpret, each one in his own way, the story 
of Hazel Notes. After all, that is what she, a Christian writer, 
had intended to write.
Critics of WB. testify to her success, because while some 
see the novel as Christian in virtually every line, others dis­
cover no evidence anywhere of Christian belief. Thus, Marion 
Montgomery sees allusions to Roman Catholicism peeping out of 
O'Connor's fiction at every turn, e.g.: "Haze goes in [the Vir—  
gin] Mary's colors, [and] his blue suit progressive1y fades as 
[he] moves closer and closer to Bethlehem" (30-31). For Isaac 
Rosenfeld, in contrast, "everything [O'Connor] says through image 
and metaphor has the meaning only of degeneration" and Hazel 
Motes is "nothing more than the poor, sick, ugly, raving lunatic 
that he happens to be."^
A comrade in Montgomery's camp sees in O'Connor's audacity 
as image-maker the consequence of a coherent vision of art as 
"eminently incarnational", comparable in its effects to the art 
of Samuel Beckett "for whom the absence of faith tends to create 
an image as distinct, with edges as clear— cut or . . .  as aflame, 
as that of the revelation in . . . O'Connor" (Gresset 108). As 
for the "initial ferocity of [her] vision", how else could her 
faith— "intransigent [and] pure"— withstand the challenge of "a 
puny world of tepidness, self-importance, foolishness, compro-
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mise, [and] mediocrity" (106)? How else if not by a fierce will 
was she to "reconcile the scandal of suffering with a vision of 
the world"?
As for the great variety of misfortunes and/or self-inflict­
ed sufferings her characters withstand, sympathetic critics have 
no difficulty at all in squaring them with O'Connor's Christian 
belief. Miles Orvell, for example, finds precedent in medieval 
Christian optimism, as described by J.L Styan:
For the devout Christian, happiness lay in the next 
world. Thus poverty, bad weather, bad crops . . .  or 
hate, cruelty, murder and crucifixion were part of the 
divine comedy. In a divine order of things the incon­
gruity of man's baseness and stupidity was part of the 
sacred pattern.^
By this sort of reasoning, no amount of violence puts into 
question the orthodoxy of O'Connor's Christianity and, certainly, 
of violence there is no shortage: Hazel Motes, for instance, 
blinds himself, invites illness through neglect, binds his chest
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in barbed wire, and sprinkles his inner soles with gravel. Andre 
Bleikasten refers to "the enormous amount of suffering and humil­
iation which is inflicted on most of O'Connor's characters, and 
the inevitability of their defeat and death" (147).
But Josephine Hendin finds it outright impossible to inter­
pret episodes, such as Solace Layfield's murder and the callous 
rejection of the pathetic Enoch Emory, as merely customary epi­
sodes on the rocky road to heaven, unless by readers whose 
"simplistic view", rather than textually justified, requires 
permanent use of "dogmatic glasses" (The World of Flannery 
0'Connor 54-55). She declares flatly: "O'Connor's assertion of 
Christian orthodoxy does not accurately describe her art", nor is
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Hendin satisfied that O'Connor's version of her religion contains 
the whole truth: "It is at least a possibility that her religion 
provided a legitimate sanction for violent and destructive im­
pulses, impulses which became acceptable when they were called 
righteous and directed at the 'godless'" (The Wor1d of F 1annery 
0'Connor 16). In fact, "religion could have been an effective 
way to express and contain fury of a very irreligious kind." (One 
wonders how O'Connor herself would have been able to offer proof 
to the contrary, she who, in spite of affirming that the direc­
tion her gift had taken "has been because of the Church in me or 
the effect of the Church's teaching", had to admit (Aug. 2, 1955) 
to her friend "A."; "I won't ever be able entirely to understand 
my own work or even my own motivations" (HB. 92).)
As for employing the conventions of the grotesque, O'Connor 
had written (April 18, 1959) to her friend "A." that that "is the 
nature of my talent" - (HB 328). Some of O'Connor's critics, 
however, do not let that statement pass unexamined. For Bleikas- 
ten, for example, the grotesque, with its "power of revelation, 
[and capacity to manifest] the irruption of the demon in man" was 
used by O'Connor very deliberately, and if it became one of her 
"privileged modes, it was because she thought it fittest to 
express her vision of reality" (141). Furthermore, "even though 
[she] defended her use of the grotesque as a necessary strategy 
of her art, one is left with the impression that in her work it 
eventually became the means of a savage revilement of the whole 
of creation" (142).
Claire Katz examines even more deeply O'Connor's predilec­
tion for the grotesque:
The writer does more than assimilate the outer world to 
his purposes; he also projects his own corresponding 
impulses onto the microcosm, shaping through his world
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a specific vision. For the writer, the inner and outer 
worlds merge in an imaginatively extended country, and 
in the fiction of [G'Connor] that country is dominated 
by a sense of immanent destruction. (54)
Over all O'Connor's haunted land presides a God found 
frightening, for instance, by the critic Frederick Asals:
Demanding everything, valuing only our diminishments, 
bringing not peace but a sword, [O'Connor's] Deity 
corresponds to no recognizable humanistic value. A 
Christian version of the fierce and awesome God of the 
prophets. He requires of man the total surrender of 
"his own inclinations." Little wonder, then, that in 
the face of such a divinity her characters all run the 
other way: it is a fearful thing indeed to fall into 
the hands of the living God. (228)
With a God such as this, comments Bleikasten, "one may 
wonder whether O'Connor's Catholicism was not, to some extent, an 
alibi for misanthropy" (142). Then again, is "so much black 
derision . . . compatible with Christian faith, and . . . what 
distinguishes the extreme bleakness of [O'Connor's] vision from 
plain nihilism?" Bleikasten notes that "Peguy and Bernanos were 
just as hostile to the secular spirit of modern times and no less 
vehement in their strictures," but even so, "Peguy also celebrat­
ed the theological virtue of hope, and Bernanos was also the 
novelist of Easter joy" (142). In O'Connor, however, no such 
celebration occurs; there is no Easter: "the most arresting 
feature, as in Swift, Kafka, or Beckett, is a compulsive emphasis 
on man's utter wretchedness, and what gives her voice its unique 
quality is a sustained note of dry and bitter fury."
In A&S Maritain writes that the inevitable conflicts occur­
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ring between Art and Prudence can be perfectly reconciled only by 
wisdom (81). Similarly, in the conflicting interpretations 
surrounding and extending even to its author, reconciliation
is not possible except by resorting to a point of view within 
which all of these interpretations can be encompassed. This is 
ultimately how Andre Bleikasten, for example, arrives at calm 
within the storm; for him, "[w]hile the Christian reader quite 
naturally takes his cue from the author and translates the psy­
chological conflict into religious drama, the non-Christian 
reader is tempted just as naturally to discuss the religious 
allegory in psychological terms" (151). For them, O'Connor's God 
is resolved into a "magnified fantasy - [a] projection of her 
overpowering parent figures."
But which of these approaches is correct? Bleikasten's 
answer is highly relevant to the subject of this thesis; "Both 
may be considered valid insofar as they provide operational 
procedures of analysis which are not contradicted by the evidence 
of the work under consideration" (151). On the other hand, "both 
may also become reductive to the extent that they pretend to have 
the monopoly of a 'correct understanding'" (151). Thus, it is 
impossible to determine "by whom O'Connor's . . . driven souls 
[are] possessed," for her work raises questions but provides no 
answers. Nor, says Bleikasten, is it "the critic's task to pro­
vide them. He reverberates her questioning in his own language 
and tries to do justice to its complexities, and this is about 
all he can do without exceeding his prerogatives" (151).
Teiihard de Chardin observed that "the universe as we know 
it is a joint product of the observer and the observed."^ Blei­
kasten states about the same with respect to the result of the 
interaction between literature and the reader; "Literature has 
its own truths, elusive and modest, truths it generates in close
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cooperation with each individual reader outside the massive 
certainties and ready-made patterns of fixed beliefs" (156). For 
him, these are the kind of truths generated in the case of O'Con­
nor's fiction, because if it indeed implicitly refers to a spe­
cific theology, "the Catholic orthodoxy of her work is at least 
debatable", and her "version of Christianity is emphatically her 
own" (156-57). Thus, room exists within the consequent ambigui­
ties for all manner of readers to arrive at their separate and 
even mutually exclusive truths. This is only possible, says 
Bleikasten, because "the truth of O'Connor's work is the truth of 
her art, not that of her church," for, if O'Connor was a Catho­
lic, she was not a Catholic novelist: "She was a writer, and as a 
writer she belongs to no other parish than literature" (157).
Alice Walker, in prose earthy as O'Connor's own, by a short­
er route comes to a similar conclusion:
As one can tell a Beardon from a Keene or a Picasso 
from a Hallmark card, one can tell an O'Connor story 
from any story laid next to it. Her Catholicism did not 
in any way limit, by defining it, her art. After her 
great stories of sin, damnation, prophecy, and revela­
tion, the stories one reads casually in the average 
magazine seem about love and roast beef. (79)
As Bleikasten's argument recalls the following stricture of 
Maritain's: "The entire soul of the artist reaches and rules his 
work, but it must reach it and rule it only through the artistic 
habitus" (67), Alice Walker's reference to the distinctiveness 
of O'Connor's work recalls another: "No doubt art always keeps 
its viae certae et determinatae, and the proof of this is that 
the works of the same artist . . . are all stamped with the same 
fixed and determined characteristics" (47), that is to say "the
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full stamp, sensitive and spiritual, not only that of the hands, 
but of the whole soul" (60).
But if, as Walker claimed, Catholicism "did not limit, by 
defining it, O'Connor's art," and if "the truth of her work is 
the truth of her art", then O'Connor can be said in this respect 
to exemplify an artist concerned only with the good of her work. 
In effect, she had taken Maritain's words to heart: "If you want 
to make a Christian work, then be Christian, and simply try to 
make a beautiful work, into which your heart will pass; do not 
try to "make Christian" (66).
On the other hand, perhaps she had already perceived herself 
unequipped to produce the kind of fiction that pious people 
unexperienced in the ways of literature could understand anyway, 
and Maritain simply provided her with the justification she 
needed to put religion behind her as she went about her work.
As has been mentioned before, Flannery O'Connor recognized 
the basis of her viewpoint as "comic regardless of what I do with 
it" (HB. 400). In a letter, to "A." (April 18, 1959) she de­
scribed her stories as grotesque "because that is the nature of 
my talent" (328). Freed by Art and Scholasticism to forget about 
the Catholic Church and to let her unique combination of "comic" 
and "grotesque" develop as it would, and having been convinced 
that, as an artist, her only responsibility was to her work, she 
could go about her task sing 1e-minded1y . If some would see her 
fictional world as impregnated by God and some would not, she 
could allow herself, perhaps blissfully, to let that matter 
remain beyond her control.
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Notes
(1) Wise Blood. 2nd ed., with an introduction by the author. 
(New York: The Noonday Press-Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1962) is 
cited as WB in the text hereafter.
(2) Quoted in Montgomery, Why Flannery 0'Connor Stayed Home 
(LaSalle, Illinois; Sherwood Sugden and Company, 19S1), 410.
(3) Quoted in Orvell, Invisible Parade: The Fiction of F 1annery 
0'Connor (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1972), 59.
(4) Quoted in Steinem, Revolution from Within (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1992), 8.
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4. Conclusion
At least four references to the teeth of her woman charac­
ters appear in W^: Mrs. Watts small, pointed ones, speckled with 
green, a space between each (33-34); the bathing-suited lady's 
pointed ones (85); the "big yellow dental plate" (192) of the 
waitress in the Paris Diner; and the plate of the landlady which 
was "too large" (220). In a letter to "A." (Sept. 24, 1955, the 
year of W^'s publication), O'Connor also mentions teeth:
If I were to live long enough and develop as an artist 
to the proper extent, I would like to write a comic 
novel about a woman - and what is more comic and terri­
ble than the angular intellectual proud woman approach- 
ing God inch by inch with ground teeth.
(WB 105-06).
Teeth, therefore, seem to have been especially useful to her 
as a means for dealing with women, whether herself or her charac­
ters: to make them ugly, or old, or bath; to suggest that they 
are slovenly or licentious; to imply that they are prepared for 
war, with their pointed teeth like those of carnivorous animals. 
In another letter written less than two years later (April 20, 
1957) to "A." (H^ 216), O'Connor employs "teeth" again, this 
time "aesthetic teeth", saying that she had cut them on A&S. The 
contexts of her previous usage have loaded this word symbolical­
ly, making this statement even more intriguing than it already 
is, having come forth from a country person averse to melodrama, 
and distrustful of bombast and hyperbole.
"Pointed" can be conceived as a synonym of "ground".
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In trying to decipher its meaning, one first recalls that 
O'Connor's family, social, educational, and literary background 
seem to have been eminently suitable to the production of one 
more genteel female member of local society. O'Connor herself, 
apparently permanently intimidated by what was conveyed to her by 
the simple name "New York", seemed to have felt at some level 
just such a product and thus unequipped to venture forth into the 
world of writing. To take herself seriously as a candidate for 
membership in the "parish" of literature, therefore, O'Connor 
would first have had to grasp the profound distinction between 
whatever the phrase "New York" represented to her, and the mean­
ing of Art.
Maritain's definition of an artist is extremely simple; a 
person with an innate capacity, a gift, and the dedication to 
develop it to the point where he has created a habitus, which 
further effort strengthens and refines indefinitely. Among the 
definition's terms, therefore, neither birthplace nor schooling 
figure. Further on in the text, Maritain does, however, stress 
the importance of roots; they must be sunk somewhere, anywhere, 
Asheville, NC, will do as well as Florida, MO, as long as they 
are strong, and sunk deeply into a community. Furthermore, an 
artist must have the discipline that makes love possible, for 
only love can engender art. And he requires courage, for art 
materializes only as the result of arduous quest. Then, certain­
ly, he must be able to withstand the demands of a solitary life; 
in no one's hire, speaking for no one, not even himself, he 
births something which must be preserved at all cost from such 
deadly influences as ego's braying, for as Maritain had warned: 
"Art tolerates no division" (A&S 67).
For her part, O'Connor knew she had a gift; an artist's eye.
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a cartoonist's concision, and the capacity to render things 
almost visible with words. Surely Art and Scholasticism enabled 
her to perceive herself as equipped with an artist's essential 
requirements. From Maritain she also discovered that warfare must 
be waged if her gift were to be developed, her habitus created, 
and she knew that, if war was necessary, war she would.
Maritain's role in this process of awakening was that of a 
facilitator, an educator functioning in the manner described by 
Aquinas, summarized in A&S; "In every discipline and in all 
teaching the master only assists from the outside the principle 
of immanent activity which is in the pupil" (A&S 43). Thus, 
Maritain in effect had said: "Look - an artist is only a person 
with a gift and a will to cultivate it tirelessly." To which 
O'Connor responded, "I can be that." Maritain had told O'Connor 
what she wanted and needed to know, to be able to release with 
confidence all her energies to the service of her will-to-art, in 
other words, to start developing her own aesthetic "teeth".
"It is our will that decides how and upon what subjects we 
shall use our intelligence" (Huxley 364), and O'Connor's will 
in all its force was behind her reading of Art and Scholasticism. 
as it was subsequently behind her writing. What else, in her 
background as she describes it, could have enabled her to channel 
her energy with such formidable determination throughout the 
remainder of her brief, illness-ridden life, for she seems to 
have been well aware all along that a gift and the desire to work 
it were all she had. Maritain was saying precisely what she 
needed to hear: "They are enough. Go forth and struggle in thy 
thickets."
Artists in general seem to agree: no other way exists. In 
spite of a widely diffused, nagging desire to discover the 
"tricks" and "secrets" of great artists, one and all they assure
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us that "there is no esoteric cook book, full of literary re­
cipes, which you have only to follow attentively to become a 
Dickens, a Henry James, a Flaubert" (Huxley 77). Their counsel 
amounts to this (and squares with what O'Connor herself eventual­
ly had to offer by way of advice to aspiring literary artists): 
"Buy quite a lot of paper, a bottle of ink, and a pen. After that 
you merely have to write" (77). O'Connor, on the authority of 
the ancients, of Aquinas and Maritain, had done exactly that, 
with faith and determination. By the time she died, on August 3, 
1964, at the age of thirty-nine, not even a sober country person 
such as herself would have been likely to deny that, by means of 
diligent, even heroic, dedication to the good of her work, she 
had made of herself an artist with (even by New York standards) a 
very sharp bite indeed.
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